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Chapter 1: Introduction
“A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but
a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern
ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with
the power which knowledge gives.” – James Madison1
When James Madison wrote those words to William Barry in 1822, he had
already retired from the presidency. As one of the authors of the Federalist Papers,
Madison is best known for his views on the importance of checks and balances in the
constitutional system. These ideas dealing with the separation of powers among the
branches of government are as relevant to the study and understanding of the American
political system in the 21st century as they were in 1787. In the above quotation, Madison
includes the role that the people should -- and must -- play in government. Over the past
two hundred years the role of the president in the constitutional system has changed, as
has the power of the presidency.
There have been presidents who have been considered to be powerful, and those
who have not. Some have been thought to be even more powerful than Congress. One
of the clearest examples of a president who expanded the power of the office would be
Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln expanded the power of the presidency, which is ironic
considering during Andrew Jackson’s presidency he denounced Jackson’s vigorous use
of presidential power, saying, “I should desire the legislation of the country to rest with
Congress, uninfluenced by the executive” (Pffifner and Davidson 2004, pg 25). His
position on executive authority changed once he entered into the White House. In
response to the crisis posed by the Civil War, Lincoln blockaded southern ports and
1 James Madison to William T Barry. 4 August 1822 Quoted in James Madison: Writings (1999).
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increased the size of the army and navy without any congressional authority (Brinkley
and Dyer 2004). Another precedent-setting expansion of executive power under Lincoln
was the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in areas along the railroad line from
Washington to Philadelphia. These actions were justified by Lincoln under his
constitutional designation as Commander in Chief. In addition, he argued the peril to the
Union made such action necessary. This peril is best described by Lincoln himself in a
letter to A. G. Hodges in April of 1964: “I felt that measures otherwise unconstitutional
might become lawful by becoming indispensable to preservation of the Constitution
through the preservation of the nation” (Pffifner and Davidson 2004, pg 35).
There have been presidents who were seen as weak and served more as a clerk to
Congress than as President. Presidents like Franklin Pierce and James Buchanan are
described as being not only weak executives but as little more than clerks and “national
caretakers who either approved or disapproved legislation developed from Congress’s
agenda” (Brinkley and Dyer 2004, pg 175). But as Richard Neustadt (1990) points out,
power for modern presidents cannot be “acquired or employed” as it was for those in the
previous centuries. The modern presidency continues to give executives the opportunity
be leaders and powerful presidents. Within the modern presidency there are examples of
both powerful and weak presidents. President Carter is viewed as being unsuccessful
president particularly due to his dealings with Congress (Milkis and Nelson 1999). There
are also those modern presidents who are seen to be expanding the power of the
presidency. President George W. Bush is seen by many as expanding presidential power
and bringing about the return of the imperial presidency (Schlesinger 2004; Brinkley and
Dyer 2004; Perret 2007). This balance of power between the president and Congress is
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one that continues to be of interest -- not only to political scientists, but to the American
public, journalists, authors, and politicians alike. Not only are all of these parties
concerned to some degree about who has the most power in Washington, but a few of
them can also play a role in potentially shifting the balance of power from the Congress
to the president.
Much has changed in the relationship between the president and Congress since
the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War the president spoke for the country on
foreign policy portraying a strong, unified front. The president was also privy to greater
information and intelligence than was Congress, thus allowing for the president to be
viewed as the decision maker when it came to national security issues. Hamilton (2006)
argues that some twentieth-century presidents, like Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and
Johnson, enjoyed the greatest control over foreign policy. However, Congress has
created an expanding role in foreign policy, an area once seen as a stronghold of
presidential power. After the Cold War ended, presidential relations with Congress on
foreign policy matters were at times rocky. Even President Reagan, who was seen as a
strong leader, faced congressional opposition over funding for the Nicaraguan Contras
and over his opposition to economic sanctions against South Africa which at the time was
controlled by the apartheid government. Since the end of the Vietnam War, Congress has
gained greater expertise on foreign policy matters, not to mention the increasing
influence of domestic policy concerns on foreign policy (Hamilton 2006). While the
president is still viewed as the most important player in the foreign policy making
process, Congress is now seen as more of a partner in the process rather than just an
observer.
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Meanwhile, presidents face technological changes and increasing media coverage
on a daily basis. The White House and the media now regularly test the waters to see
how much the American public approves (or disapproves) of the job the president is
doing. Executive-congressional relations are shaped by a variety of issues, but what is of
interest here is how that relationship varies across policy types, and how the public’s
approval of the president may shape his relationship with Congress. Edwards (2006,
2002, 1989) argues that presidents continue to try to garner public support, not only for
themselves but also for their policies. This, according to Edwards, has created a
permanent campaign in the White House. While presidents may speak out for purposes
other than just to influence public opinion on their policies and job performance, they do
attempt to use the bully pulpit in order to gain continuing favor with the American public.
Presidents often assess the opinions of the public as well as the costs in public support
before going forward with a policy course (Kernell 1997).
Presidential success -- or more simply, how often the president gets his/her way
with Congress -- is influenced by more than just which party controls the White House
and which controls the Hill. Presidents are often tempted to go around Congress in order
to get their way. This is usually done by using the American public, or “going public,” as
Kernell (1997) describes it. A president “goes public” when s/he appeals directly to the
American public on an issue. The public then gives the president the leverage s/he needs
in order to persuade members of Congress toward his/her position. The president does
not have to bargain directly with Congress when individual members are susceptible to
public pressures (Kernell 1997). The partisan composition of Congress and the role of
the public may influence when a president is successful, but the issue the president is
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dealing with may also make a difference in presidential success. Presidents are often
measured by how successful they are in domestic versus foreign policy.
Much can be learned by comparing the varying rates of presidential success over
time and in examining particular presidencies and the individual circumstances of each
administration. Studies which compare presidential success over time allow scholars to
look at the impact of time-related factors, like congressional reform (Marshall 2003) or
the impact of key time periods like the Cold War or Vietnam (Auerswald 2006). One
benefit of having multi-year models is that when only a few cases are examined, there is
a possibility that the results are based on change; including more cases decreases this
possibility (King Keohane and Verba 1994). The results from this type of comparison
allow for the systematic comparison of many cases at once. This helps to ensure that the
results are not limited to just one or two presidential administrations. In contrast, a case
study of one administration allows more specific legislative and approval details to be
discussed. Also, a case study can allow for greater understanding of how even within one
administration unique factors may have a dramatic impact on the president’s relationship
with Congress. Focusing narrowly on one president or one specific issue can provide
results which fit into broader research questions and can help to rethink how a theory of
presidential success relates to any one president.
This dissertation will examine two important issues that affect executive-
congressional relations. The first is the effect of public opinion on presidential success in
domestic policy. A president’s legislative success is influenced by a variety of
congressional and executive factors, some of which the president can control (like the
type of policy he/she takes a position on) and others, like partisan control of Congress, in
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which he/she may have little say. The role of popularity and its impact on the executive-
legislative relationship has long been a question that political scientists have grappled
with (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Edwards 1989, 2002; Neustadt 1990) when trying to
determine why some presidents are more successful with Congress than others. This is by
no means a new question: Many different researchers have examined this issue from a
variety of positions and theories. Richard Neustadt (1990) asked, “What can this man
accomplish to improve the prospect that he will have influence when he wants it?” (16).
Since Neustadt’s Presidential Power was initially published in 1966, it has served as a
jumping-off point for those studying the presidency and presidential power. Mueller
(1973) took the first serious look at presidential approval ratings, and Edwards (1989)
furthered the field with At the Margins: Presidential Leadership of Congress.
Presidential-congressional relations have been examined from the points of view of both
institutions (Thurber 2006; Fleisher and Bond 1996; Binder 1996; Jones 1994; Sundquist
1992), and the relationship between the president, the press, and the public has likewise
been examined (Edwards 2006; Canes-Wrone 2004).
Secondly, my research sheds additional light on the question of whether the type
of policy impacts the president’s ability to be successful with Congress. One question at
the center of this study is whether we can expect to see the impact of popularity and other
factors, like divided government, impact presidential success differently when it comes to
domestic policy versus foreign policy. In looking to answer these questions, this
dissertation moves beyond the existing literature by adding a new dimension to the
research. This new dimension is based on using policy-specific success models and
including approval ratings into these models. The current literature looks at either
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domestic or foreign policy, or combines the two. I argue that looking at legislative
success in each policy area at the same time allows for the comparison of what tools and
factors affect presidential success in domestic policy and if these factors behave similarly
in foreign policy. I contend that not only will using policy-specific job approval data
increase the understanding of approval on presidential success, but also that we will see
that approval affects foreign policy differently than domestic policy. To accomplish this,
I examine presidential success over time in both domestic and foreign policy. This
provides a broad understanding of how success in each policy area has operated over
time, and how public approval in each of these areas operated from 1971-2004. I also
include a case study of the first term of George W. Bush. This case study will help to
highlight how within one presidency, public approval can change due to outside
circumstances, and can impact the president’s relationship with Congress.
The overall objective of this study is to expand the understanding of the role that
job approval plays in presidential success in a policy framework. The reasoning and
motivation behind this research is two-fold. First, it seems unusual that in the current
setting presidents would spend so much time and energy courting public opinion if it did
not have an impact on their ability to do their jobs. The inherent question and challenge
then is how to operationalize this relationship in a manner that gives the best potential to
see how this relationship works. Secondly, the dichotomy between how the president
behaves in domestic policy compared to foreign policy is continually of interest.
Domestic policy allows the president to more easily create long term plans and ideas,
while so much of foreign policy is reactionary. Much can be learned about the
presidency as a whole, and about individual presidents, by examining the way the
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president approaches each of these policy areas. It is the desire to better understand these
two areas that drives this study.
Organization of this Study
Following this introduction, chapter two provides a theoretical background to
executive-legislative relations and the role of policy type and public approval. The
theoretical argument contends that the factors that influence legislative success in
domestic policy are different from those that affect foreign policy. The chapter
emphasizes how the relationship between the executive and the legislature changes from
domestic to foreign policy, and why looking at success in these two policy areas is
important to understanding the process. The chapter also reviews developments in the
understanding of how and when public approval impacts presidential success.
Chapter three explores presidential success over time in the domestic policy
arena. Beginning with the end of Nixon’s administration through the first term of George
W. Bush, the chapter provides an analysis of what factors have influenced success in this
area since 1971. This chapter introduces the research design and variables that will be
used in chapters three and four. Included in the discussion and analysis in this chapter is a
measure of job approval data focusing specifically on approval of the president in the
domestic arena.
Chapter four expands the discussion and model used in chapter three to include
foreign policy in the analysis. As with the third chapter, regressions are set up to test
foreign policy success and foreign policy approval in several different models. Here we
see not only the results for foreign policy, but we also begin to see how foreign policy
operates differently than domestic policy. One key result is that foreign policy job
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approval, or approval of any measure, has no effect on foreign policy success. The
results also reveal that foreign policy approval does affect domestic policy success.
Chapters five and six provide an in-depth case study of President George W.
Bush’s first term in office. In these chapters, I take a more detailed look at the types of
legislation on which President Bush took a position. In chapter five I also discuss Bush’s
public approval ratings from 2001-2004, initially in an overview of his first term, and
later in more detailed analysis. This analysis includes a discussion of how successful
Bush was in foreign and domestic policy votes, as well the impact of terror policy on his
legislative success. Chapter six also includes a statistical analysis focusing on what
factors affected the likelihood of legislative success for President Bush. I also consider
what legislative variables influenced both in- and out-of-party support of the President.
Finally, I am able to assess the impact of terror policy on legislative success.
Chapter seven reviews the argument and findings presented in the dissertation. It
details the contributions of the study and the implications it has for future research. I
conclude that public approval, even in a policy-specific approach, does impact domestic
policy success, but only marginally so. Even in those models where approval is
significant, approval makes far less of an impact on success than other factors like unified
government, policy type, or tenure in office. That said, the significance of approval in
the overall and domestic policy models does add to the existing literature that approval
does, at times, serve as an additional tool in helping the president to get his/her way with
Congress. I also conclude that within the first four years of the Bush presidency,
legislation focusing on terrorism met with greater support from Congress than other types
of legislation. In fact, in two of the models the President was less successful in all
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foreign policy matters compared to domestic and economic policy matters. Lastly, I
argue that the role and impact of terror policy on the Bush administration warrants further
research.
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Chapter 2: Executive-Legislative Relations and Public
Approval
“Presidential popularity is a major source of strength in gaining cooperation from
Congress.” – Lyndon Johnson2
Americans expect their presidents to be all things on all issues – economic policy,
domestic policy, and at the same time be a world leader. We want him/her to be able to
lead in both domestic and foreign arenas, all the while keeping and improving the
economy. In order to accomplish these lofty goals, the president is forced to work with
Congress in order to pass legislation and make key policy decisions. Some presidents are
more successful at this endeavor than others. Political scientists like Neustadt (1990);
Mueller (1973); Wildavsky (1966); Canes-Wrone (2006); and Bond, Fleisher and Wood
(2003) are just a few who have investigated what makes presidents legislatively
successful. These works set the foundation for this research which focuses on how both
type of policy (domestic versus foreign) and public approval can influence presidential
success. Each approaches the task of examining presidential success in a different
manner, from looking at crises faced by individual presidents (Neustadt 1990) to
attempting to flush out the role public approval plays in the president’s ability to do
his/her job (Bond et al 2003; Canes-Wrone 2006).
As a foundation for advancing the understanding of how policy type and public
approval influence presidential success, this chapter summarizes the current
understanding of executive-legislative relations across policy types and the specific role
of public approval in each policy arena. The current literature on presidential-
2 Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969 New York: Popular
Library, 1971, p 443. Quoted in Edwards On Deaf Ears (2004)
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congressional relations identifies three key issue areas which are important to this
research. To say that presidential success varies from president to president would be
stating the obvious: some presidents have simply been more successful than others at
getting their agenda passed (Neustadt 1990; Bond and Fleisher 1990, 1995, 2001;
Fleisher et al 2000; Canes-Wrone et al 2006). But success or failure is not determined by
the president alone: they are forced to deal with Congress in order to get legislation
passed. The founders created a rivalry when they gave lawmaking power to the Congress
and approval power to the president.
The continuous thread running between all of these issue areas is that they deal
with the give-and-take between the president and Congress. The first of these areas is
presidential performance with regard to foreign versus domestic policy. Here we see the
research focusing on congressional support of the president in both foreign and domestic
policy. The evolution of the “two presidencies” theory is central to this discussion,
seeing how presidential support in foreign policy has changed over time and how it
compares to support in domestic policy (Prins and Marshall 2001; Fleisher et al 2000;
McCormick and Wittkopf 1990; Wildavsky 1966).
The second group of existing research focuses on the overall role of public
approval in presidential performance. This body of research has the broadest array of
existing literature of the three groups. One aspect of this research focuses on what factors
impact presidents’ public approval and the influence approval has on generating policy
(Canes-Wrone and de Marchi 2002). Another focuses on the effect of public approval on
presidential success (Bond et al 2003; Edwards 1983), and it is this portion of the
literature that is of the most interest for this research. From here the existing information
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on the relationship between public approval and presidential success can be used to set a
strong framework for this research. Additionally, examining this body of research can
assist in seeing where the gaps in the current research exist.
Lastly, there is literature on the role that foreign or domestic policy approval plays
in determining presidential success (Ponder and Moon 2005; Bond et al 2003; Canes-
Wrone 2004; Edwards 1989, 2002; Meernik 1993; Kernell 1997). This area of research
is the least developed of the three and has the potential to fill the gap in the previous two
categories by unifying the approval and policy research. In this grouping we see the two
other categories joined together to examine presidential-congressional relations,
including both public approval and the role of policy type. The gap in the existing
literature caused by not fully exploring the potential relationship between policy and job
approval is where this research will fit.
Foreign and Domestic Policy Differences
There are a variety of questions at hand when examining presidential policy
success. While many of these questions, like the role of divided/unified government, will
be dealt with later on in this and later chapters, what is initially interesting is what the
existing literature tells us (or does not tell us) about how domestic and foreign policy
operate. Do the existing theories suggest that we should examine these two policy areas
in the aggregate as well as individually? The easy response to that question is yes; there
is in fact evidence to support the theory that presidential success in the foreign policy
arena operates differently than domestic policy. Do the tools the president uses to be
successful in domestic policy work as effectively in foreign policy? The literature
addresses how the president has historically been more successful with Congress in the
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foreign policy arena – but it is lacking on why this occurs outside of a constitutional
framework (Thurber 2006; Hamilton 2006; Marshall 2003; Prins and Marshal 2001).
The role the Cold War played in presidential success in foreign policy has been
addressed, but the continually changing world makes foreign policy issues continue to
impact the relationship between the president and Congress. If the two presidencies is
indeed dead (and what impact has 9/11 had on it?), is it revivable? The literature has yet
to deal with the post-9/11 relationship between the executive and legislative branches in
foreign and domestic policy. The existing research does support the view that while an
examination of success in the average can provide varied information; individual
analyses are also beneficial in the study of executive-legislative relations.
One area of research where political scientists (Prins and Marshall 2001;
Schraufnagel and Shellman 2001; Fleisher et al 2000; Conley 1997; McCormick and
Wittkopf 1990; Wildavsky 1966) highlight the differences between legislative success in
foreign and domestic policy is the “two presidencies” research. In 1966, when Aaron
Wildavsky published his article “Two Presidencies,” he argued that in the United States
there are two presidencies, one for foreign and one for domestic policy. Since its
publication, political scientists have debated whether this thesis is correct and more
specifically if presidents actually receive greater support from Congress in the foreign
policy arena. Wildavsky’s original contention is that the United States has one
presidency for domestic policy and a second for foreign policy. In the original thesis,
Wildavsky finds that the foreign policy president is the more powerful of the two. He
backs this finding with the claim that between 1948 and 1964 there was not a single
major foreign policy issue where presidents, when determined, failed (Wildavsky 1966).
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Wildavsky characterizes the president’s problem with domestic policy as needing
to obtain congressional support for his/her programs, while for foreign policy the
president can “almost always get support for polices that he believes will protect the
nation” (pg 7). The power the president has in foreign policy does not “reside in the
greater constitutional power” but instead comes from the changes that have taken place in
the world since 1945. One key change would be the potential use of nuclear weapons.
Because of these changes, foreign policy is a higher priority for presidents and the speed
needed to make foreign policy decisions places the president in a position of control that
does not exist in domestic policy. While Wildavsky acknowledges that Congress does
exercise power in foreign affairs, he does not view them as competition for the precedent.
Another difference that Wildavsky points out is that in foreign and defense policy, the
president is less likely to “play politics,” while in domestic policy there is more politics
and greater influence of political parties. In foreign policy, Wildavsky argues that the
president is often the sole decision maker and needs to develop and enact solutions in a
much shorter time span, often outside of the prevue of the Congress.
From Wildavsky’s initial hypothesis, a slew of studies came forth to assess the
validity of the theory. One group of criticisms focuses on the time-bound nature of the
two presidencies finding, that it no longer holds true when additional years are added to
the analysis (Schraufnagel and Shellman 2001; Edwards 1986; LeLoup and Shull 1979).
Other research found that the two presidencies effect only occurred under certain
circumstances, specifically only when the president is a Republican (Fleisher and Bond
1988). The continuing discussion of the two presidencies not only includes the problems
associated with its time-bound nature, but also the question of whether the continued
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testing of the hypothesis is worthwhile (Fleisher et al 2000; Canes-Wrone et al 2006).
Canes-Wrone, Howell and Lewis (2006) argue that there is clear cause to believe that
presidents continue to exercise greater influence over foreign affairs compared to
domestic. Their study moves beyond the traditional testing of the two presidencies thesis
-- which uses roll-call voting as the basis of measurement -- and instead focuses on
agency creation and budgetary issues. For these purposes, the discussion is not whether
or not the two presidencies thesis is still accurate, but the validity in framework that it
provides for why the two policies types can be viewed and studied as distinct (Canes-
Wrone et al 2006; Prins and Marshall 2001; Edwards 1986).
The difference in domestic and foreign policy making goes far beyond the two
presidencies debate. While the president and Congress share power in both these areas,
the manner in which they share power is different, in both constitutional and power-
brokering aspects. From a constitutional perspective, Congress has the central legislative
powers, while the president has the authority to recommend and veto legislation. The
president is the Commander in Chief and has the authority to negotiate treaties and
receive ambassadors, though he/she does need the “advice and consent” of the Senate on
treaties and ambassadors. While the Constitution places the power to declare war solely
with the Congress, the interpretation of this power continues to be a source of conflict
between the executive and legislative (Thurber 2006; Yoo 2005; Schlesinger 2004; Adler
1988). This shared power has become an even greater sticking point with regard to
foreign policy since the end of the Cold War (Jentleson 1997; McCormick and Wittkopf
1990).
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While the role the president takes in foreign policy is different from domestic
policy, the view that national security and foreign affairs are solely under the executive
office is certainly shifting. The president has the power through executive orders,
executive agreements and national security directives to operate without congressional
approval. This gives power to the president in all policy making, but especially so in
foreign affairs where the effects of these powers is of note because of the impact on
national security as well as the secretive nature of the orders (Canes-Wrone et al 2006;
Howell 2003). Presidential power in foreign affairs is also different from that of domestic
policy because the president has the power to quickly mobilize the military in times of
war and crisis. But even with the traditional view, presidential dominance in foreign
affairs has come into question. Prins and Marshall (2001) find that bipartisan support in
foreign affairs has declined since the end of the Vietnam War. These findings are
consistent with similar research by Fleisher et al (2000). There has also been an increase
in overlap in issues that were once clearly foreign and domestic policies. Congress deals
with a rising number of high profile policy issues seen as having both domestic and
international implications. These dual policy issues, like immigration and trade, become
increasingly important when they have direct electoral implications for members of
Congress (Prins and Marshall 2001; Conley 1997; Lindsay 1994). Even with this growing
overlap in congressional attitudes, there is a need to differentiate between overall support
for the president and support in foreign and defense policy versus domestic policy.
Foreign and Domestic Policy Approval
The body of research on public approval and the presidency falls into two main
sets. The first looks at the president’s ability to lead and manipulate public opinion
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(Edwards 2006; Cohen 1997; Brace and Hinkley 1992; Edwards 1983; Ragsdale 1984).
Here the discussion focuses on when -- and on what issues -- the president can garner
public support. This support can be either for his/her administration or a specific policy
on which she/he is focusing. The goal of this research is to understand the president’s
ability to affect and influence public opinion (Bailey et al 2003).
The second set looks at the role that public approval has in presidential policy
making and relations with Congress (Canes-Wrone 2004; Edwards 2002; Canes-Wrone
2001; Kernell 1997; Bond and Fleisher 1990). In this set the research examines how
popularity can affect presidential policy making. Another key area in this discussion is
how and if public approval influences the president’s ability to achieve policy success.
Here the literature attempts to link public approval to executive-congressional relations.
A third set is additionally relevant to understanding the presidency, though this set
is not typically linked to presidential power. This large set examines the formation of
public opinion and policy preferences (Page and Shapiro 1992; Maggiotto and Wittkopf
1981; Carmines and Stimson 1980; Key 1961). It is within this group that a broader
understanding of how the American public views domestic and foreign policy is found.
The public opinion literature provides the groundwork for knowing what issues the public
tends to form opinions on and what issues it does not. Key here is the discussion of what
factors influence opinion formation and how these opinions influence policy beliefs as
well as partisan behavior.
Within the public opinion realm, researchers continue to investigate how the
public forms policy preferences. Much of the work goes back to V.O Key’s (1961)
theory that public opinion does not directly set policy but provides the range or limits of
19
policy and serves as a guide or constraint on policy making. Another key work that sets
the foundation for the understanding of public opinion is the examination by Page and
Shapiro (1992) that analyzes public opinion over fifty years, finding that preferences
among the public tend to be consistent over time. One key finding is that overall public
opinion is relatively stable and reasonable. Also important is the view that the electorate
is able to distinguish between different types of policies (Page and Shapiro 1992).
While opinions on domestic policy tend to be relatively stable, opinions on
foreign policy are often more volatile (Wittkopf and McCormick 1993; Page and Shapiro
1992; Corrigan 2001). Early studies on the role of public opinion in foreign policy found
that the American public was not capable of holding stable attitudes in foreign policy.
“The mass public is generally uninformed about either the specific foreign policy issues
or foreign affairs in general” (Rosenau, 1961, p. 35). During times of foreign policy crisis
the public’s attitude may shift away from indifference but is still considered to be
superficial (Jacobs and Page 2005; Erikson, Mackuen and Stimson 2002; Sobel 2001;
Wittkopf and McCormick 1993; McCormick and Wittkopf 1990; Maggiotto and
Wittkopf 1981). This literature forms the basic understanding that foreign policy
attitudes are different from domestic policy attitudes (Maggiotto and Wittkopf 1981).
This understanding is central for my research because it helps to support the view that
public attitudes and approval behave differently in these two policy areas. It therefore
lends credence to this examination that includes different measures of opinion operating
in two policy areas.
There is a school of thought (Carsey and Layman 2006; Kim, Scheufele and
Shanahan 2005; Carmines and Stimson 1980; Page and Shaprio 1992; Converse 1964;
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Downs 1957) that focuses on how and why Americans form the opinions they do, and
domestic policy issues have often been a strong part of this research. One view of public
opinion that provides a distinction between foreign and domestic policy opinion is the
comparison of “easy” and “hard” issues. Those issue areas viewed as “easy” tend to be
more symbolic than technical and cue into core values. These are often domestic policy
issues like abortion and race (Carmines and Stimson 1980). In contrast, “hard” issue
areas tend to be more technical and include how goals are achieved rather than the goals
themselves. Issue areas like foreign policy and regulatory policies tend to be considered
“hard” issues (Bailey et al 2003; Maggiotto and Wittkopf 1981). While there are
domestic policies in both categories, the “easy” versus “hard” issue areas is just one
example of how foreign policy opinion is considered at times to be different from
domestic policy opinion -- not just in how it is expressed but also how it is formed.
When it comes to foreign policy, the complexity of the issues at hand and the
impact that complexity has on opinion formation tends to be the focus of the previous
literature. Foreign policy is considered to be a classic complex issue and the
understanding has been that the public is more supportive of a foreign policy when they
believe a president favors it (Bailey, Sigelman and Wilcox 2003; Conover and Sigelman
1982). For a time it was thought that the American public was generally incapable of
holding any consistent views on foreign policy (Almond, 1950). While foreign policy
crises may have forced some Americans out of indifference, the general attitude was still
seen to be superficial and fluctuating (Wittkopf and McCormick, 1990; Sobel 2001). This
early perception of how Americans formed public opinion on foreign policy has changed
over time, shifting to a view that the collective opinion of the public does tend to be
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rather stable, and when opinion regarding foreign policy does shift it occurs for reasons
that are both predictable and rational (Dempsey 2006; Page and Shapiro 1992). Much of
the recent literature has focused on the causal relationships between foreign policy
events, the media, elite opinions and public perceptions (Dempsey 2006; Jentleson and
Britton 1998; O’Neal et al 1996; Page and Shapiro 1992).
Despite the differences in how the public reacts to foreign and domestic policy,
the role that approval plays in presidential performance tends to focus on a broad overall
understanding of how presidential approval works. Widely accepted is the view that the
public can be influenced by symbolic cues a la rally around the flag (MacKuen 1983;
Mueller, 1973). In times of international crisis, the American public rallies behind their
leaders – rallies which reflect a patriotic support of the executive (Erikson, Mackuen and
Stimson 2002; Mueller 1973; Parker 1995). International events that trigger a use of
force by U.S. troops are typically followed by an increase in presidential approval
(Mueller 1973; Kernell 1978; Marra, Ostrom, and Simon 1990; Baum 2002).
Additionally, the general view is that changes in public approval tend to be
incremental and that there will be variation in popularity over a president’s term (Mueller
1973; Kernell 1978). Generally, in any one administration popularity will decrease over
time (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Light 1991). This decrease over time is linked to the
honeymoon period where Congress and the press appear to be more accommodating to
the president -- an accommodation that quickly dissolves (Neustadt 2001). Light (1991)
finds that presidential capital tends to decrease throughout a president’s term in office.
Capital plays an important role in setting a presidential agenda and as a president’s
capital contracts, it directly affects the likelihood of passing his domestic agenda (Light
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1999). Tied to capital is what Light refers to as the “cycle of decreasing influence.”
Presidential capital, time, and energy are the basis of this cycle. “As the term winds down
the President simply does not have enough time to pursue major initiative” and “…In the
first term, Presidents are forced to allocate their time between the domestic agenda and
the campaign” (Light, 1991, pg. 37).
While approval and formation of opinions on the president are not the central
focus of Presidential Power, Neustadt makes key observations about the role of approval
that are relevant to the current discussion. One of the best and most interesting
observations Neustadt makes is with regard to what issues the public cares about and
pays attention to versus the issues that they do not. He begins with the idea, “One never
should underestimate the public’s power to ignore, to acquiesce, and to forget, especially
when the proceedings seem incalculable or remote from private life.” He then goes on to
observe that “paychecks, grocery bills, children’s school, sons at war are quite distinctly
matters of real life.” (p.72). From these observations, first made in 1960, one can
continue to draw examples like the Clinton campaign’s “it’s the economy, stupid” to the
role of the Iraq war in seeing how the public’s opinion can directly impact electoral
outcomes.
Public Approval and Presidential Success
Another key issue in the study of presidential success with Congress is the role
that public approval does or does not play. It is in this body of literature (Bond and
Fleisher 1990; Edwards 1989, 2002; Meernik 1993; Canes-Wrone 2004) where much of
the work combining presidential success and public approval is found. The existing
literature not only provides a strong framework for how to create models to test theories
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on the role of success, but also for how to see what areas have yet to be flushed out,
allowing for future research opportunities. What we can see broadly from the existing
literature on approval and success is two-fold. First, there is no clear consensus on if
approval matters to presidential success. Secondly, when success is even included in the
discussion of presidential-legislative relations it is typically included as overall job
approval ratings and averaged by year.
Much like the debate over the “two presidencies” theory, there has been
significant back-and-forth in the literature over whether or not approval matters, to what
extent, and what the best measure of approval is. Currently, there are two main branches
of the research on presidential approval (Edwards 2006, 2004, 1989; Canes-Wrone 2006;
Kernell 1997; Wittkopf and McCormick; Rivers and Rose 1985; Ragsdale 1984). One
examines how presidents can impact their approval and the other focuses on how
approval impacts legislative relations. What does seem to be universally accepted in the
literature is the view that approval matters to the president and Congress. Despite the fact
that the relationship between approval and presidential power may be difficult to prove
empirically, those inside Washington perceive that approval provides a tool for the
president (Edwards 1997, 2003; Ponder and Moon 2005). Many refer back to Neustadt
for the theoretical justification of why approval is significant and any description of the
state of the literature that did not refer to this research would be lax. In Presidential
Power (1990), Neustadt provides many insights into how presidents yield power. One
asset or tool the president has in getting what he or she wants (especially with Congress)
is his standing “with the public outside of Washington” (Neustadt, 1990). That being
said, the basic understanding is that while approval may play a role in helping the
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president, it is certainly a secondary role when compared to other factors. In speaking of
prestige Neustadt observes, “A president’s prestige is thus a factor in his influence of
roughly the same sort as his professional reputation: a factor that may not decide the
outcome in a given case but can affect the likelihoods in every case and therefore is
strategically important to his power” (p. 69). Richard Neustadt’s description of the role
prestige plays in the balance of power has been the jumping off point for much of the
literature dealing with approval in the executive-legislative context.
The literature on approval and legislative success marries the two previously
discussed perspectives on the presidency. This group of research not only looks at the
president’s ability to persuade or mobilize the public; but also if he can exploit that
mobilization or the “bully pulpit” into some form of legislative success. In discussing
presidential leadership of the public, Edwards (2004) quotes David Gergen, a White
House communications adviser, in describing how Ronald Reagan was able to turn
television “into a powerful weapon to achieve his legislative goals.”
The research dealing with the potential impact of approval on executive-
legislative relations is where I will spend a significant amount of time reviewing the
existing literature and examining the different findings. The current state of the literature
sets the continuing tone for the debate over whether or not approval matters. One cause
for the debate over the current findings -- as well as the variance in the empirical findings
-- is due to the manner in which approval and legislative success are measured. This
issue will also be covered in the following section, as will a discussion of the issues and
the literature associated with the use of public support and other factors that are (or in
some cases are not) critical resources for the president. The cultivation of public support
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for use as a policy resource for the president is what Kernell (1997) refers to as “going
public”. This presidential action occurs when “a president promotes himself and his
policies in Washington by appealing to the American public for support” (Kernell 1997
pg. 2). A president then enlists the public as a third party in order to force Congress to
accept his preferences. Going public deals directly with the relationship between the
executive and legislative branches and how the public plays into that relationship. It is
the relationship between the Congress and the president that drives the research between
these two branches.
I find it necessary to return to the basic concept of constitutional structure. The
basic design of the system, with its checks and balances, forces the executive and
legislative branches to “share power” as Neustadt so famously describes it. Not only
must the president contend with the legislative branch, but s/he also has to deal with each
chamber’s unique set of rules and members (Edwards 2004; Marshall 2003; Binder
1999). So while the checks and balances were designed to produce, as Edwards puts it,
“sound, moderate legislation through a process of negotiation and compromise,” they
also make it more difficult for the president to build coalitions and gain legislative
support. Commenting on Neustadt’s observation that the constitution created “separated
institutions sharing power,” Thurber observes that this makes it “difficult for presidents
to bridge the constitutional gap even in the best of political circumstances” (Thurber
2006, pg 7). The constitutional structure leads us again to what we do know about the
relationship between the executive and legislative branches: that public support may just
be one factor influencing voting in Congress. Others include ideology, party, individual
policy goals and responsiveness to constituencies (Edwards 2004). This understanding of
26
the role approval plays is an underlying theme in the literature examining the relationship
between approval and success, and is never forgotten in this research. Because while
some have raised concern with the idea that Congress is at all responsive to the
president’s public support, even those who do believe there is a relationship understand
that it is generally “modest” (Edwards 2004, 2002, 1989; Canes-Wrone 2004, and de
Marchi 2002; Brace and Hinkley 1992; Bond and Fleisher 2003). The partisan nature of
Congress, in action with the constitutional framework, make it so no matter where the
president stands in the polls there will always be those who oppose his (or potentially
her) policies.
There are certainly expectations that drive the notion that popularity should matter
in a legislative context in the first place. The president wants to get his agenda passed
and the majority party in Congress, of course, wants to get its agenda passed. The
president, in wanting to get what he wants done, will use the tools he has to help give him
an advantage over Congress. Here we see public support and public approval become a
presidential resource (Kernell 1997). The need for this resource is what motivates the
White House to garner support, and the belief that this is in fact a resource is what makes
Congress take notice of the president’s approval. George Edwards (2004) cites a quotes
Newt Gingrich from a 1990 New York Times article: “If the president’s popularity is at 80
percent, I think the president can do whatever he wants” (Edwards pg 15).
This leads us again to the question of why – why should public support for the
president influence how Congress behaves? Neustadt (1990) deals directly with this
question in his analysis of presidential power. In his view, presidential persuasion is key
to presidential power and that power includes influencing the Congress. “The essence of
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a president’s persuasive task is to convince such men that what the White House wants of
them is what they ought to do for their sake and on their authority” (Neustadt 1990, pg
43).
This theory of power has been operationalized into empirical models to further the
understanding of presidential legislative success. Two main views are taken when
examining presidential legislative success. One view (Bond and Fleisher 1990, Bond et
al 2003; Conley 1997; Ponder and Moon 2005) focuses on roll-call votes as the measure
of legislative success. The other focuses more on legislative outcomes and bills as the
measure of success (Edwards 1989, 2002; Canes-Wrone 2006). The key difference
between using roll-call votes and bills is in the outcome portion. Several roll-call votes
can occur on for one bill. The advantage of using roll-call votes allows for increased
cases in the discussion as well as the availability of the information from Congressional
Quarterly. The literature that focuses on bills looks at end products. The advantage here
is the information from the actual bill and the final vote on legislation but also the
decrease in likelihood of one bill being included in the analysis several different times
through different roll-call votes.
Beyond this, the research then divides into what additional factors are included in
determining success. Bond, Fleisher and Wood (2003) and Canes-Wrone (2004) both
include legislative and executive factors into their models, but to understand the
reasoning of why public support should matter, a more congressional perspective is
useful. When a president has high approval ratings, congressional members may be more
able to vote with the president even when this means voting against the views of their
constituents back home. Conversely a president with low approval ratings may find it
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hard to get members of Congress to support him (Edwards 2004). From a congressional
perspective, recognizing that a key (if not main) interest for a member of Congress is that
all-important need for reelection keeps Congress’ attention on the public’s view of the
president (Arnold 1980, 1990). Depending on the president’s public standing, members
may choose to either be close to him or distance themselves from him in order to better
their chances. There is a whole body of research that has looked at relationship between
support for the president and congressional elections (Jacobson et al 2004; Abramowitz
and Segal 1992; Edwards 1979). One need only quickly look at the 2006 congressional
election to see how both Democratic and Republican candidates used the president and
the War in Iraq in the campaign. For Democratic candidates, the key was linking their
opponents to President Bush, whose overall popularity hovered around 37 percent
(Gallup 2006).
So what does the existing literature tell us about approval and success? Ostrom
and Simon (1985) examined the presidential approval focusing on the president’s ability
to influence citizen opinions. This research focuses not on the role of public support as
political research, but on how a president can influence public support. This research,
and the pieces similar to it, are important because they help to re-establish the idea that
public support has value as a resource, making it something worthwhile for the president
to try to influence and garner (Ostrom & Simon 1985; Light 1982; Kernell 2005).
Mueller (1970) contributed one of the early pieces of research on factors that influence
approval. Mueller’s research was important not only in its study of overall approval, but
more specifically on foreign policy approval. What this and other works have found is
that some issues are more salient than others in the public’s evaluation of the president
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(Mueller 1973; Edwards 1990; Ostrom & Simon 1985; Brody 1991; Edwards et al 1995).
Most of this research is grounded in the view that individuals typically only have a few
issues which are important to them and that they pay attention to (Converse 1964). The
existing research in this area has also shown that presidents may use certain tools, like
press conferences and speeches, to influence their approval ratings.
This first stream of research is important for this because it helps to establish the
importance of presidential approval in the political game as well as in the study of the
presidency. Again, if approval did not have some role as a tool for presidential power
then there would be less need for understanding how a president can go about cultivating
approval. While the later group of research does not typically apply time-series models,
this dissertation will. The previous use of time-series models has been useful in the study
of explaining presidential approval and can potentially be useful in the study of
explaining how approval impacts presidential success.
This research topic is most often examined by looking at presidential support over
time. Edwards (1989, 1997, 2005) has set the standard for not only theoretically
justifying why approval matters but also for how to go about researching approval and
success. In Edwards (1980, 1991) we see the marriage between the two styles of research
on presidential approval. Edwards focuses not only on how presidents can influence their
approval but on why approval is important in the politics of policy making. He
establishes and adds to the theory behind the relationship between presidential popularity
and presidential success by explaining the underlying principle behind the relationship:
that the popularity or unpopularity of a president will cause members of congress to
adjust (Edwards 1980; Borrelli and Simmons 1993).
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One approach in the study of legislative success is in a series of pieces by Bond
and Fleisher (Bond, Fleisher and Wood 1999; Bond and Fleisher 1990; Fleisher and Bond
1984). Their research has focused mainly on the importance of the measure of success
and has looked at roll-call votes over a significant period of time. The main contribution
their research has made to the literature has been in the debate over choosing which votes
to include in the modeling of success. Bond and Fleisher have continually stressed the
fact that the Congressional Quarterly data is not thorough enough and may exclude
certain votes, especially when using the key vote index. To support their claims they
have tested their measure of success in a variety of ways. The models used by Bond and
Fleisher (1999; 1990) have included individual member voting records on the presidential
position votes, as well as overall presidential success rates for both branches. While they
have had much success in their examination of presidential success, their findings have
focused mainly around a “Congress-centered” approach. This approach focuses on
congressional factors, like the partisan and ideological composition of the House and
Senate as the key explanatory variables in determining presidential success (Bond and
Fleisher 1990; Covington et al 1995). The effects of presidential popularity have been
found to be “marginal at best” (Bond and Fleisher 1990: 25). Several studies have
further supported this view, arguing that there is little or no statistical relationship
between presidential success and popularity (Bond, Fleisher & Wood 2003; Bond and
Fleisher 1984, 1990; Collier and Sullivan 1995).
One attempt to settle the controversy surrounding the relationship between
approval and support has been to take a more state-level approach. In these models, the
data focus more on state-level approval ratings and how they directly relate to
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congressional votes (Cohen et al 2000; Ponder and Moon 2005). One examination of this
type of model has lent support to those who argue that there is no empirical relationship
between public approval and legislative success (Cohen et al 2000). The Cohen et al
examination focuses on just one point in time – September 1996 -- making it difficult to
create any generalizable results from their research, and it does not push the approval
debate clearly one direction or another. Their research does look at a variety of
hypotheses, including the role of party support and electoral vulnerability, and creates
potential models for later research. Ponder and Moon (2005) do a nice job of reminding
readers that the measure of presidential approval affects if and how it impacts presidential
support in Congress. Expanding beyond Borrelli and Simmons’ (1993) use of electoral
contexts and individual member support of the president based on average Gallup data,
they examine approval by congressional members’ constituencies. While this is a very
useful step in the understanding of how approval influences support, in the examination
of the roles of foreign and domestic policy approval this form of data is not available.
Like much of the existing literature on approval and success, this research will begin with
an average measure of support. But unlike the existing literature, the average scores used
are not for overall approval, but instead policy-specific approval. This research also
includes approval, by policy area, in a bi-annual manner.
Other researchers have focused on one policy arena, like foreign policy, in their
examinations of executive-legislative relations. McCormick and Wittkopf (1990)
examine the validity of two key views on foreign policy making, the bipartisan and
political perspectives, to see which of these best describes executive-legislative relations
in a post-Vietnam era. These two perspectives are grounded in the literature, with the
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political perspective viewing partisanship as the key factor in determining how members
will vote (McCormick and Wittkopf 1990, Bond and Fleisher 1990). In bipartisan view,
congressional support in foreign policy is different from that of domestic policy because
members of Congress are less constrained in their voting behavior in foreign than
domestic policy (McCormick and Wittkopf 1990, Edwards 1989). The overall finding
from these perspectives is that both are appropriate to use in the study of executive-
legislative relations in foreign policy. The McCormick and Wittkopf (1990) piece is
relevant here, not only because it helps to frame the importance of looking at domestic
and foreign policy individually, but also in how it uses, or more so does not use public
approval in the analysis. The focus of the piece is less on congressional behavior and
more a study of the role of bipartisanship and ideology in policy support. In the later
empirical chapters, the importance of partisanship and in- and out-of-party support
factors in the analysis and is grounded back to this study. A later study by these same
authors further expands literature on executive-legislative relations in foreign policy.
Again hoping to gain greater understanding of the relationship between these two
branches they look at the impact of the end of the Cold War on support in the House for
the president’s foreign policy agenda.
Their overall finding is that the end of the Cold War may have changed the
agenda, but the process is still very much the same. In fact, ideological preferences
remain the important explanation of presidential support (McCormick and Wittkopf
1998). Here they include presidential popularity as a contextual factor in determining
support, as well as the Cold War, partisanship and ideology. The models here focus
mainly on member support of the president with popularity as a secondary issue. The
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measure of popularity used here is the president’s average annual popularity across each
Congress and is combined with inflation levels to make a single measure of the domestic
political environment. When measured this way, it is found that popularity has a
significant (although signed the wrong direction) effect. One concern with measuring
approval in this way is not only the lack of variation within each year of the measure, but
also in taking an overall measure of approval and applying it to the analysis of foreign
policy.
What the divergent findings on the role of approval and presidential success
suggest is not so much that any one methodology is correct but that a variety of methods
are available to research this issue. Analyses that look at overall success over time tend
to use larger models with a variety of independent variables and use correlations and
multivariate regressions in their analysis (Bond and Fleisher 1990). Others examining
success in one area may use methods specific to the research question at hand and may
use specific types of regressions depending on their unit of measurement (Marshall 2003;
Ponder and Moon 2005). The findings also suggest that there are other factors that
influence presidential success (Borrelli and Simmons 1993; Bond and Fleisher 1990). If
anything, the state of the literature limits the role that we expect approval to have in any
model attempting to explain executive-legislative relations. We know that other key
factors, mainly partisanship, are better at explaining voting behavior than approval. The
relationship between approval and success may only exist during certain time periods or
on certain issues. That being said, we have seen falls and rises in partisan behavior in
Congress, implying that partisanship may not always be the only explanation of
presidential support. This adds to the issues surrounding the shift from congressional
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acquiescence on foreign policy to an involved Congress in this area, and makes the
examination of the role approval has played over time even more important. The
literature has shown that not only can we expect foreign and domestic approval of the
president to behave in different manners, but that the executive-legislative relationship in
these two areas is different. The two somewhat obvious observations help to frame the
basic framework of this research, that in order to better understand if and when approval
influences the relationship it is beneficial to examine the relationship in a separated
manner as well as in the average. This way, we can see if Congress is more responsive to
public approval in a policy context. While the existing literature has helped to flesh out
some of the issues surrounding the contextual nature of approval, mainly by focusing on
the time period or individual member support, there is still plenty of room for additional
study.
The goal of this dissertation is not to end the debate. Instead, it hopes to add some
clarity and additional information to the discussion. By looking at approval in a different
context, my hope is to shed some additional light on how certain issues may influence
this relationship. What we know is that public approval of domestic policy has the
potential to behave differently than that of foreign policy. We also know that executive-
legislative relations in foreign and domestic policy often differ. While approval has been
used in models of presidential success and while presidential success has been viewed in
the two disparate policy areas, this research takes the next step and combines these two
views. Presidential success in foreign policy should operate with approval in foreign
policy better than overall approval. The same should be said for domestic policy. What
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the next few chapters do then is take what we know and what we hope to know and test
this view.
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Chapter Three: Presidential Domestic Policy Success
“Public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment nothing can fail; without it
nothing can succeed.” – Abraham Lincoln3
For good or for bad, presidents care about what the American public thinks. The
idea that there is a relationship between public approval and the presidency is certainly
not new to either political scientists or politicians. As Chapter Two discusses, political
scientists have spent much time and effort to determine if and when public approval
influences a president’s ability to lead. The existing literature not only examines the
relationship between public appeals and job approval, but also the impact of this approval
on legislative success (Canes-Wrone 2004; Edwards 2006; Kernell 1997; Cohen et al
2000). In this context, I measure the effect of presidential leadership by looking at
presidents’ support in Congress. To build upon the existing literature, this chapter will
focus on presidents’ legislative success in the domestic policy arena and the role public
approval plays in this success.
This chapter explores the relationship between presidential job approval and the
president’s success with Congress. The first section describes the methodology and
models used in this chapter and in the following chapter. The second section provides a
brief overview of traditional definitions (and my definition) of presidential success and
presidential approval and the relationship between the two. In the third section, I discuss
the possible variation in the relationship between public approval and the president’s
legislative success across distinct substantive policy domains, focusing specifically on
3 From Lincoln’s first debate with Stephen Douglas on August 21, 1858. Bartleby: Great Books Online.
(n.d.) Retreived June 1 2007, from http://www.bartleby.com/268/9/23.html
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trends in domestic policy success and public approval in this area. I present the results of
this analysis to test the overarching theory that public approval in specific policy areas
has a significant relationship with presidential success in those areas.
Methodology and Presidential Success
Since legislative success is a focal point of my analysis, an empirical
understanding of what success is not only useful, but will also help to connect this
research back to the some of the existing literature. I say some of the literature because
there is no universally-accepted notion or measure of presidential success. Depending on
which stage of the process one chooses to focus -- agenda setting, legislative action or
implementation -- one finds distinct measures of how or when a president is successful in
his dealings with Congress.
For my research, the framework being used is based on presidential legislative
performance. This allows for the examination of how public approval influences his/her
ability to deal with Congress directly. The use of roll-call votes in one form or another is
one significant way to examine executive-legislative relations (Bond and Fleisher 1990).
The president’s position on roll-call votes alone shows the “sharing” of power between
the two branches. While Congress is constitutionally the writer of laws, the president’s
performance is often judged on the basis of ability to achieve the desired outcome, be that
passage or failure, on those proposals in which he takes an interest (Ponder & Moon
2005; Conley 1997; Bond and Fleisher 1990). The issues surrounding Congress and the
presidency “sharing powers” are only exacerbated by the fact that the president is in
many ways dependent on Congress in order to achieve their policy objectives, since the
government cannot be run on executive orders alone (Conley 1998).
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One advantage to basing my measure of presidential success on the roll-calls that
the president has taken a position on is that all presidents take a position on votes -- some
more than others, but all do. Figure 3.1 shows the total number of roll-call votes on
which presidents have taken positions. This data was collected from Congressional
Quarterly reports on presidential position-taking and the Bond and Fleisher presidential-
congressional data set (Bond and Fleisher 2007). On average, presidents took 67
positions in the House and 14 in the Senate. Of all the years included, Carter has the
highest in 1979 with 244 and George W. Bush has the lowest in 2004 with 52. Carter,
Reagan and the elder Bush were consistently above average, while both Clinton and the
current President Bush were below average with some high points; 1995 for Clinton and
2003 for Bush.











































































One problem in this type of research, and the disagreement that continues to exist
between political scientists, is the question of how one chooses which votes to include
and which to exclude from this data-set of roll-call votes. The one consistency throughout
the research is that the main set of votes is obtained by those presidential position roll-
call votes identified by Congressional Quarterly. This score is calculated by the
percentage of roll-call votes on which congressional members voted in agreement with
the president. Several analyses of presidential success base their measures of
presidential support on a subset of roll-call votes on using either non-unanimous votes or
key votes in the House and Senate (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Edwards 1980, 1989). Bond
and Fleisher (1990; 2002) have based their research on non-unanimous votes arguing that
by excluding votes with over 80 percent helps to limit the analysis to relatively important
issues on which there was some controversy (Bond, Fleisher and Wood 2003; Bond and
Fleisher 1990).
Another concern is that some of the votes are on the same issue or bill. The
example given by Bond and Fleisher (1990) is an omnibus program that CQ divides into
several different votes. In this chapter, both overall success and success in domestic
policy are discussed. To do this, I include all roll-call position votes, not just those with
less than 80 percent support. From the Bond and Fleisher perspective, this somewhat
limits my results since some issues are potentially less conflictual. However some of
these votes with near unanimous support have substantive relevance to the research (like
the Patriot Act in 2002) and therefore are important to include in the analysis. Rather
than cherry pick roll-calls with over 80 percent support are substantively worthy, all are
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included. As for the second concern on how votes are counted, one reason for including
all of the CQ-identified votes is that while there may be several votes on one particular
bill listed, often times this includes votes on amendments (some of which may be
germane to the bill itself). The CQ-identified positions on roll-calls have also been
consistently used in the literature (Edwards 1980, 1989) and they provide a broad picture
of a president’s legislative success. Using this measure throughout the research also
allows for the consistent comparison of presidents over time.
One of the issues within the existing literature on the role that public approval
plays in executive-legislative relations is the concern that this measure examines approval
as well as success in the average. Success scores are often viewed in terms of overall
success combining domestic, economic and foreign policy votes into one large category.
This is of course a useful endeavor, but there is also the potential to view success within
policy areas. Several authors examining presidential success have already evaluated
variation across different policy domains (Ponder and Moon 2005; Sobel 2001; Prins and
Marshall 2001, Wittkopf and McCormick 1998). As for public opinion, the most often-
used measure of presidential approval is average national approval of the president. This
version of presidential approval provides a stable and consistent measure but includes
only overall job approval at the national level, without including any measure of
constituency approval or policy-specific approval. One potential solution is to include
and assess state-level data to see how the relationship works from this perspective. This
examination can test to see if members of Congress are concerned with their electoral
constituencies’ approval of the president rather than a broader, more national measure of
approval. This has been done by Ponder and Moon (2003). Another option, and the one
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which is explored here, is to examine the approval-success relationship at the policy
level. One implication of this examination is that while approval may have some
marginal effect on overall success, it may have a more substantial impact on specific
policy types or by specific policy approval.
Methodology and Public Approval
Important not only to the subject matter at hand, but also the discussion of what
influences presidential success, is the role of public approval. The Gallup organization
has polled the American public on their level of approval (or disapproval) of the president
since 1938. Since then select groups of Americans have been asked, “Do you approve or
disapprove of the way [president’s first and last name] is handing his job as president?”4
Figure 3.2 shows the average responses to this question by year, since 1953. This figure
illustrates some largely held beliefs or opinions on how popularity changes over time.
Obviously, for each president there is variation in popularity over time (Mueller 1973;
Bond and Fleisher 1990): popularity tends to be high early on in an administration but
then drops over time (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Brace and Hinkley 1992; Ragsdale 1998).
4 The question until 1981 was “Do you approve or disapprove of the way [president's last name] is handling
his job as President?” it was then changed to include the first and last name of the president.
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Source: Gallup poll (various years)
In this chapter, I am interested in the role that domestic policy approval plays in
overall success but also upon success within the domestic policy arena. A justification of
the measure of approval in domestic policy is essential to the discussion. In these
models, the public approval measure comes not from questions directly on domestic
policy but instead on economic policy. This variable is based on the CBS/New York
Times survey which asked, “Do you approve or disapprove of the way [the President] is
handing [economic] policy?” This survey question was asked multiple times each year
between 1971 and 2004.5 Until 1981, a direct question on domestic policy was not
consistently asked. The role of economic approval as it relates to overall approval ratings
5 In order to obtain additional cases to capture at least one term of the Nixon presidency, the foreign policy
public opinion variable was based on Nixon’s average scores on approval ratings on foreign policy issue
areas including Vietnam, World Peace and relations with China and Russia. This was done because the
standard public opinion question was not asked during that time period. However, the standard economic
survey question was asked during the Nixon years and that variable is based on those results.
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is also firmly grounded in the literature (Mueller 1973; MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson
1992; Wood 2000; Edwards 2003). As Wood (2004, p. 574) simply states, “[P]residents
wanting to maintain public approval need to appear to be leading the economy.”

























































































Source: Gallup poll (various years)
Figure 3.3 shows the trend in economic approval from 1971 through 2004. Of
interest is that President George H. W. Bush had the lowest average economic approval
(18.45%) in 1992. Bush’s highest economic approval rating during 1992 was in January
with 23 percent approval. This low approval rating is somewhat surprising when
compared to the expected lows of Presidents Ford and Carter, who both presided during
economic recessions. Carter does have the second lowest rating, at 20.4 percent, in 1979.
The higher ratings, found during the end of President Clinton’s second term, are not
surprising. Considering the economic success in the late 1990s, this high approval rating
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is to be expected. As the figure highlights, there is a steady increase from 1993 through
2000. One possible explanation for the decline in after 2000 would be the economic
impact 9/11 had on the country. What we do see is that, much like general job approval,
there is a great deal of variance over time and between administrations. Unlike general
approval, economic approval is most often under 55 percent approval rating and only
peaks above that for four years during this time period. Overall job approval is above 55
percent nearly half the time. These approval ratings are consistent with the findings of
Wood (2004) where he finds that the American public holds the president accountable for
U.S. economic performance and notes that presidents have increasingly discussed the
economy publicly.
Domestic Policy Models
This analysis includes an overall measure of presidential success, as well as
domestic and foreign policy success, for every president from 1971-2004. While success
rates are available for the years prior to 1971, policy-specific polling data is not, therefore
the sample size is somewhat limited. However, the 1974-2004 time period is interesting
for several reasons. It includes several shifts in power from Republican to Democratic
presidents, periods of both divided and unified government, and encompasses the last
portion of the Vietnam War, the end of the Cold War and the first Gulf War. While the
Cold War is not included in this chapter, it is considered to be important and is discussed
in the next chapter when we examine foreign policy and executive-legislative relations.
Figure 3.4 shows the overall support for the presidents used in this analysis.
Success is measured by the annual number of House and Senate roll-call votes from
1971-2004 in which the president’s position won. As previously stated, presidential
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positions on roll-call votes are identified in annual reports by Congressional Quarterly.
As one can see, there is a great deal of variance in overall success over time. One high
point was in 2002 just after the 9/11 attacks, when President George W. Bush had an
overall average score of 87.8 percent. This is in sharp contrast to the low point in 1999
for President Bill Clinton during the height of the Monica Lewinsky scandal or during the
1995-1996 budget fight between President Clinton and the Republican-controlled House.


























































































The question I will pose first is what factors, including approval, influence overall
success? Next, we will shift focus towards an examination of success strictly in domestic
and economic policy. The domestic policy success score was calculated by taking the
percentage of victories on domestic policy roll-calls on which the president took a clear
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position (as identified by Congressional Quarterly). Congressional Quarterly publishes
overall support scores annually and historic overall success rates (including nominations
in the total calculation), historic domestic and foreign policy scores are not available
through CQ. These were calculated using the Bond and Fleisher dataset of congressional
votes for the years 1971-1994. One difference between these two data sets is that the
Congressional Quarterly scores include nomination votes in the Senate while the Bond
and Fleisher data set does not. When nomination votes are included, the overall success
rate of a President tends to be higher, given the bipartisan support usually found for
nominees. The omission of nomination votes was continued in the calculation of the data
from 1995-2004. Post-1994 data was calculated by the author in the same manner used
by CQ, by taking the total proportion of presidential victories compared to the total
number of positions taken by the president. The data was then divided between
foreign/defense policy and domestic policy and presented separately as overall success
and success within both chambers of Congress. Figure 3.5 shows the range of success
rates in domestic and economic policy during this period. This graphic highlights that
presidents often start out fairly successful with Congress and then decline over time.
This is by no means a new idea; the concept of a strong first year is grounded in the
perception of the “Hundred Days” when Congress is more likely to defer to the positions
proposed by a new president.
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Much like overall success, domestic policy success varies greatly over time both
within and between administrations. It also varies greatly between the two chambers of
Congress. Figure 3.6 shows the support of the president in domestic policy in both
chambers. The House is shown to be less supportive of the president over time,
reflecting the role that divided government played in the mid-1980s when the Democrats
controlled the House and the Republicans controlled the White House. This can also be
seen with the Republican-controlled House in 2000 and 2001, which was more
supportive than the Senate in those years, reflecting the shift in power in the Senate from
split to Democratic control. The existence of divided government was incorporated into
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the multivariate regression model in order to further measure the effect of this factor on
presidential success. In this case, it was considered to be divided government if either of
the two chambers were controlled by a party different from the party of the president.



























































































As previously mentioned, there are other factors that are influential in
understanding presidential success with Congress. Several of these, like tenure in office,
are also included in the quantitative models. These additional variables are by no means
theoretical stretches, and are, in fact, just a few of the potential explanatory variables that
one could use when examining presidential-congressional relations. It is important to
remember that public approval competes with other factors, such as ideology, party, and
personal views (Edwards 1989). In fact, approval is thought to be far less important a
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factor when examining congressional voting behavior than these other factors (Edwards
1989). That being said, I find approval to be theoretically significant and where
applicable, it will be used throughout the models in this and the following chapter.
One area of interest is the impact of time in office on a president’s ability to pass
his/her agenda. This follows Light (1991), who argues that presidential capital decreases
throughout a president’s tenure in office. Tied to capital is what Light refers to as the
“cycle of decreasing influence.” Presidential capital, time and energy are the basis of this
cycle. The underlying argument behind the “cycle of decreasing influence” is that as
capital and other influential factors decline, a president has a more difficult time in
passing his/her agenda. This concept is measured by a simple year in tenure count
ranging from 1-4 for the first term and 5-8 for the second term.
Just by a cursory look at Figures 3.2 and 3.3, one can see there is significance to
the idea that time in office matters to approval rating levels. Within each administration,
presidents tend to start off with higher approval ratings. These ratings tend to decline
over time, unless of course there is some type of event that causes approval to move in
the opposite direction. While these events tend to be of a foreign policy nature, which
will be discussed in greater detail in chapter four, an easy example would be the first Gulf
War in 1991. Here President George H. W. Bush’s approval ratings increased annually,
from 66 percent in 1990 to 72 percent in 1991.
The second concept incorporated into the research design is the idea of unified
versus divided government. There has been much discussion, by Mayhew (1991) and
those responding to him, of the impact of unified government on legislative output. This
research does not intend to reopen the divided/unified government debate. The intent of
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the unified government variable is in the vein of V.O. Key (1964) and Sundquist (1980).
Their understanding is that the president has an easier job getting Congress on his/her
side when his/her party is in the majority in one or both chambers of Congress.
Sundquist (1980) argues that the president and Congress are bound to disagree, and even
“quarrel,” over issues. During periods of divided government, we would expect a
president to have a more difficult time with his/her legislative agenda. The current
literature also shows us that there has been a rise of partisan politics in both Congress and
the White House since the 1980s (Fleisher and Bond 2000; Aldrich 1995; Fleisher and
Bond 1996; Rhode 1991). For our purposes, divided government is viewed simply as
the president being of one party and either chamber of Congress being of the opposite. It
is coded simply as a dichotomous variable (0 divided; 1 unified).
The size of a party’s majority in Congress can also play a role in presidential
success. We expect that not only the president’s party control the House or Senate to
matter but also the size of the president’s party in either chamber to also contribute to
legislative success. The larger the majority of the president’s party in either chamber, the
greater the expectation that the president will achieve legislative success (Krehbiel 1998;
Canes-Wrone and de Marchi 2002).
The models used in the next two chapters also examine not only overall
presidential success but success in both chambers of Congress. To get a broader view of
executive-legislative relations and the role of approval in those relations, it is important to
examine the relationship from several different angles. While the president’s success rate
may not differ greatly between the two chambers, the institutional dynamics -- especially
when looking at foreign and domestic policy -- may potentially lead to different
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outcomes. Not only does the Constitution give the Senate more direct foreign policy
power through approval of treaties and ambassadors, but the Senate is seen typically as
being more assertive in foreign policy than the House (Lindsay 2003).
The first model used will be similar to those found in the existing literature. The
dependent variable will be the Congressional Quarterly overall presidential success score
for each year from 1971-2004. This model will also include the president’s average
Gallup score of overall approval. The regression model is as follows:
Presidential Overall Support Score = a +
ß1 (president’s yearly public approval) +
ß2 (unified or divided government) +
ß3 (tenure in office) +
ß4 (party %)
The second model will examine the impact of economic/domestic approval on a
president’s overall success. The dependent variable in the regression model, again, is the
Congressional Quarterly measure of overall presidential success, or the percentage of
times Congress voted with the president on a specific piece of legislation. The regression
model, estimated separately for overall success within the House and the Senate, is as
follows:
Presidential Overall Support Score = a +
ß1 (president’s economic policy approval) +
ß2 (unified or divided government) +
ß3 (tenure in office) +
ß4 (party %)
The third model, while similar to the first two, will examine the impact of
economic/domestic policy approval on a president’s success in the domestic policy arena.
52
Here the dependent variable in the model will be the measure of success for only
domestic policy matters.
The regression model, estimated separately for overall success within the House
and the Senate, is as follows:
Presidential Domestic Policy Support Score = a +
ß1 (president’s economic policy approval) +
ß2 (unified or divided government) +
ß3 (tenure in office) +
ß4 (party %)
As discussed earlier, there is a basis in the literature to expect a relationship
between presidential success and public approval. There has been research on both sides
of this issue, some showing direct effects of public approval and some finding marginal
impact (Edwards 1980; Rivers and Rose 1985; Bond and Fleisher 1990). Unlike previous
studies of executive-legislative relations that have used basic correlations or standard
OLS regressions to test for a potential relationship (Ponder & Moon 2005; Conley 1997;
Bond and Fleisher 1990, Wittkopf and McCormick 1989), our first test of the theory that
public approval does have an effect on success uses a Prais-Winsten regression. This
allows the data to be analyzed in a time-series manner while correcting for
autocorrelation. Previous studies that focused on determining factors that influence
presidential approval have used a Prais-Winsten test, allowing for the examination of the
impact of variables over time (Atkeson 1998; Jackman 2000). It is also expected that the
models in this chapter will have serial correlation due to the time-series nature of the
analysis. The Prais-Winsten test is the preferred correction for this problem (Durbin &
Watson 1950; Wooldrige 2003; Gold & Robinson 2005).
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Impact of Public Approval on Overall Success
Table 3.1 shows the results from the initial examination of presidential success
with Congress. Here the measure of approval is the average Gallup annual approval
rating for the president. The first column shows the results for overall Congressional
support of the president, in both domestic and foreign policy matters. The second column
shows support for the president in just domestic policy matters. The measure of tenure in
office is significant in both models. Gallup approval is significant in the domestic policy
models as is the size of the president’s party in the Senate.
Table 3.1: Regression Analysis of Presidential Success including Overall Job Approval
Overall Success Domestic Success
Gallup 0.216 0.309+
(0.211) (0.233)
Tenure in Office -2.652** -2.990**
(0.940) (1.030)
Unified Government 8.366 7.992
(8.391) (9.279)
Cold War 4.106 -4.285
(5.383) (5.172)
Party % House -0.043 0.210
(0.478) (0.492)






Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The reported results are from a one-tailed test.
A Prais-Winsten regression was used to calculate these results
As per the literature, (Light 1999) the “cycle of declining influence” variable was
significant and negative, suggesting that the later in a president’s term, the less successful
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he will be with Congress. This also supports the established notion of a presidential
“honeymoon” period. The honeymoon period refers to the early part of a president’s
term when typically the press, Congress and the American public give the president a
certain amount of latitude and the benefit of the doubt. This allows for a president to
potentially use the honeymoon to be more legislatively successful.
So what does this first look at approval show us? If anything, it shows there is a
subtle relationship between presidential approval and domestic legislative success. It also
shows that when including approval in a model using the standard measure of average
yearly Gallup ratings, approval is significant. However, it is significant at the lowest
possible level and the effect approval has on the success rate is much less than tenure in
office. The impact of approval seems to influence success minimally. Considering that
approval is measured this way even in those studies where it is found to be statistically
significant, it does beg the question of whether or not this is the best method to measure
approval. One potential solution to combat this question is not to have yearly, but rather
bi-annual or quarterly measures of approval. This solution would allow for the
examination of how the changes in the public’s approval of the president may more
directly impact success, rather than looking at an annual approval that evens out the highs
and lows that may occur within the year. Unfortunately for the time period covered in
this chapter this data is not readily available. However, an alternative potential solution
is possible. This solution includes the second and third models of success, to include a
measure of domestic policy (or in this case, economic policy) approval rather than simply
a measure of overall approval.
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Impact of Economic Approval on Overall Success
The focus of the following sections will be the role economic policy approval
plays on how successful the president is with Congress. In order to compare the
effectiveness of this measure with the Gallup measure, a model similar to that in the
previous section was run. Again, the dependent variable was the president’s overall
success with Congress in both domestic and foreign policy. The difference included in
this model is the president’s average annual approval rating on economic policy.











Party % House -0.059
(0.475)






Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The reported results are from a one-tailed test.
A Prais-Winsten regression was used to calculate these results
The results of the regression are shown in Table 3.2. As in the previous model,
both tenure in office and president’s party size in the Senate are statistically significant.
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Again, it seems that presidents are more successful with Congress earlier in their tenure
in office. The results also support the view that the stronger the size of the president’s
party in the Senate, the more legislatively success the president will be. Kreihbel (1998)
makes a case for the impact of party size in the Senate on legislative success and the
significance of the party size variable in the Senate supports this view that the greater the
size of the majority the greater the potential for legislative success.
This initial regression has found support for the theory that over time public
approval has been a factor in success. While it is by no means the strongest factor, it
does have an influence. Here we see that economic approval is significant in predicting
presidential success. The impact economic approval has on overall success (.215) is
actually less than the impact the Gallup variable had on overall success (.309), though the
difference is slight. In fact, this may be due to the high correlation (r = .64) between
these two variables. Despite these two variables being correlated, the remainder of the
chapter will use the use the economic approval measure. The use of this measure, rather
than the Gallup measure, will help to further explore the potential role of economic
approval. The next section will examine how it impacts success in domestic policy.
Additionally, the unified government variable was not significant in any of the models,
which is a surprising result. This lack of significance may be do to a high correlation
with the party size variables. Unified government was significant in models which did not
include the party size variable.
Impact of Public Approval on Domestic Policy Success
The analysis thus far has looked at overall policy approval and overall policy
success. In this section I analyze this relationship using a subset of domestic policy votes
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to determine if approval has a relationship in each policy area. To further my theoretical
view that public approval matters not only in legislative policy areas but also in different
policy areas, the models include a measure of domestic policy approval in the analysis.
The dependent variable in these models is the rate of presidential success in
domestic policy for the House, Senate and both chambers. Roll-call votes coded as
domestic would include roll-call votes dealing with abortion, education, health care,
economic affairs like appropriations for domestic agencies, and gun control. Also
included in the model are measures of unified or divided government and time in office.
Here we see the use of the different types of divided government, with an overall measure
of divided government used in the overall success model and then by-chamber divided
government used for each chamber’s model. The area of most interest in this analysis is
the measure of domestic policy approval that is also included in the model.
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Table 3.3: Regression Analysis of Presidential Success in Domestic Policy
Overall Success House Success Senate Success
Economic Approval 0.296+ 0.483+ 0.117
(0.182) (0.247) (0.193)
Tenure in Office -3.544** -3.113* -3.596**
(1.051) (1.271) (1.109)
Unified Government 9.097 20.532+ -6.901
(9.588) (12.478) (7.976)
Party % House 0.273 0.645
(0.511) (0.569)
Party % Senate 0.853 1.923**
(0.665) (0.585)
Constant -3.719 6.376 -27.942
(27.339) (25.956) (28.755)
Observations 34 34 34
R-squared 0.63 0.56 0.56
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The reported results are from a one-tailed test.
A Prais-Winsten regression was used to calculate these results
Table 3.3 shows the results for each of the three models. On domestic policy
votes, we find that approval is positive and significant, though the levels of significance
differ from chamber to chamber. While approval is statistically significant for overall
success and success in the House, it loses its significance in the Senate. One possible
explanation for this is that the House, being the “peoples’ chamber,” is more mindful of
the whims of the American public. Another explanation may be that given the electoral
term differences between the House and Senate, the House members may to be more in-
tune with public approval and the possible electoral rewards in aligning with or against
the president. Interestingly, the size of the president’s party in the House is not
significant in either the overall or the House models. One certainty is that the two
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chambers do not always behave in the same manner with regard to public approval. This
adds validity to the models examining overall success while also separating out the two
chambers.
The results of our model also find the existence of unified government not
significant. However, the size of the president’s party in the Senate is significant. The
models also support the view that where a president is in his/her term can impact his/her
success. The negative relationship in the overall, House and Senate models shows that
the earlier a President is in his/her term, the higher his/her percent of legislative success.
While the approval coefficient is certainly the smallest and is less statistically
significant than the other two variables, it does support the view that approval, more
precisely policy-specific approval, does have a relationship with presidential success in
that policy area.
The literature to date gives us the overall view that while we expect public
approval to matter, it is difficult to support that empirically and it often only matters “at
the margins.” This chapter has taken a first look at what we already know about the
overall relationship between approval and presidential success and has begun to examine
success and approval in a less general sense, within specific policy areas.
Although I find a small relationship between domestic approval and domestic
success, a positive relationship does exist and tends to support the view that in domestic
policy, members of Congress would be influenced by how the public views the president
when determining their votes. Because the public tends to be more attentive to domestic
(and economic) policy matters, I certainly expect this type of approval to matter more in
these policy areas. The differences between the chambers are minimal in this area,
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showing that the House and Senate are both influenced by public approval of the
president’s positions. Of course, in this model approval is certainly less important than
unified government or the term in office. This seems to ring true with what we already
know about approval. It is not viewed as the key determining factor in whether or not a
president is successful. Instead, it works best when framed in a way that presents
approval as an additional tool for the president to use in accord with the other tools he
may already have at hand. For those presidents late in their terms or facing divided
governments, public approval may become a more important tool in forming coalitions in
order to get their agendas passed.
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Chapter Four: Presidential Foreign Policy Success
“You are, I am sure, aware that genuine popular support in the United States is required
to carry out any Government policy, foreign or domestic. The American people make up
their own minds and no governmental action can change it.” – Franklin D. Roosevelt
(1882–1945), U.S. president. Letter, March 29, 1945, to Joseph Stalin.
When American troops were sent to Somalia during the George H.W. Bush
administration, most Americans supported the humanitarian mission that included
delivering food to starving people (Jost 1994). Then, on October 4 ,1993, the initially
humanitarian mission turned deadly and the American public viewed the image of a dead
American soldier being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. The consequent
firefight between U.S. troops and Somali rebels left 19 Americans dead and nearly 80
wounded. The public backlash was immediate. Within days of the firefight, the
American public was demanding a withdrawal of American troops from the region (Jost
1994). The Senate began discussing legislation calling for an immediate withdrawal. By
October 7, President Clinton announced that while enforcements were being sent initially
a firm deadline for withdrawing combat troops would be set.
This anecdote highlights the intertwined and often complex relationship between
public approval and the president’s ability to make foreign policy. The relationship
between the executive and legislative branches is often complicated and at times difficult
when it comes to policy making of any sort, let alone foreign policy. The goal of this
chapter is to extend the discussion in chapter three by further examining of how public
approval of the president, with regard to foreign policy, influences his/her ability to
achieve legislative policy objectives. As always, it is important to frame the issue from
both legislative success and job approval viewpoints. This chapter, like the previous one
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on domestic policy, begins with a review of both of these issues with a central focus of
the role the foreign policy plays in each.
Presidential Success and Foreign Policy
Before getting into the heart of the discussion public approval plays in policy
success, it is important to reiterate the differences in foreign and domestic policy. There
is a general understanding that has been established in the literature that we can, and
should, think of foreign policy making as different from that of domestic policy (Canes-
Wrone et al 2006; Sobel 2001; Prins and Marshall 2001; Meernik 1993; McCormick and
Wittkopf 1990, 1998; Wood and Peake 1998). The role the president plays in these two
areas is significant in general, but as one can see from the theme of this dissertation, it is
also significant and important to view each of these two areas in a stand-alone fashion.
One of the key views useful in framing how the behavior of the president in
foreign policy is different from that in domestic policy is Aaron Wildavsky’s “two
presidencies” theory. Wildavsky’s (1966) original view is that the president has greater
success when dealing with Congress on foreign and defense policy issues compared to
domestic policy issues. The heart of the two presidencies thesis deals with the
institutional role that Congress plays in the domestic policy decision-making process.
While there are constitutional limitations on what the president can do domestically,
foreign policy is traditionally the main arena of independent presidential power. For
Wildavsky, the president is better equipped than Congress to direct and control foreign
policy. On the flip side, Congress takes a more active part in the domestic policy process.
Over time, scholars have begun to question the validity of this hypothesis
(Schraufnagel and Shellman 2001; Fleisher et al 2000; Edwards 1986). This theory has
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been the center of much debate among political scientists with discussion ranging from
how to best measure success (Fleisher et al 2000) to the time-bound nature of the theory.
One key criticism is that while the “two presidencies” may have captured the dichotomy
in foreign and domestic policy during the Cold War, its applicability in a post-Cold War
era remains to be seen (Fleisher and Bond 1991).
One valid observation by critics of the “two presidencies” is that the foreign
policy making process has changed since 1966 and the constraints the president faces
now are different from those in the past. Even if presidents are no more successful in the
domestic arena than in the foreign, the general view is that the issues the president faces
in foreign policy are substantively different from those he faces domestically. While a
president may be no more or less successful in one policy area versus another, moving
past the “two presidencies” debates means taking the domestic/foreign dichotomy to the
next step. It is from this perspective that we move forward to see if the factors that
impact success in foreign policy are different from the factors that impact success in
domestic policy. For this research, we are primarily concerned with the role of job
approval ratings.
Methodology and Foreign Policy Success
Regardless of the point of view one takes on the continuing validity of the “two
presidencies,” the assumption we are working with is that foreign and domestic policy
making are different. This assumption does not bias the results in one direction or
another. If the two policy areas are not distinctive, then the lack of distinction should be
apparent in the results of the foreign and domestic models. However, if the two policy
arenas are distinctive, there should be notable differences in the results of the models.
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The difference between presidential power and legislative success in foreign and
domestic policy is highlighted not only in the two presidencies literature but also in the
research on policy formation (McCormick and Wittkopf 1990, 1998) and foreign policy
making (Sobel 2001; Prins and Marshall 2001). In both foreign and domestic dealings,
the president has always depended on public approval as a source of strength in dealing
with Congress (Sobel 2001; Prins and Marshall 2001; Wood and Peake 1998; Neustadt
1960). While the Constitution may put limits on the president’s authority and power with
regard to foreign policy, the advice and consent of the Senate is needed to make treaties
and Congress holds the power to make war. There is little question the president is
viewed by the public -- and those inside the Beltway -- as primarily responsible for
foreign policy (Sobel 2001; Marra et al 1990). Many foreign policy issues and concerns
do not function in the same gradual manner as domestic policy issues (Wood and Peak
1998). If anything, foreign policy issues tend to be responses to dramatic occurrences or
the results of crises.
As in the previous chapter, presidential success is measured by the portion of roll-
call votes in which the president got his/her way, compared to all of the roll-call votes
identified as being ones the president took a position on. This is accomplished by using
Bond and Fleisher’s voting data for 1971-1994 and Congressional Quarterly’s reports on
presidential position-taking from 1995-2004. For this chapter I begin by looking at those
roll-calls identified as being either foreign or defense policy. Foreign policy votes include
votes dealing with defense, military, foreign aid and trade issues that did not have
domestic policy implications. The figures present are the percent of “wins” compared to
the total number of roll-calls the president took a clear position on. As can be observed
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in Figure 4.1 presidential success in foreign policy with Congress has a broad range, from
the high eighties for Carter and H.W. Bush to the low twenties for Clinton in 1999.
Throughout the 1980s, presidential success in foreign policy averaged 70 percent --
higher than the overall average for the time period of 65 percent. As one would expect,
there is typically a high point at the beginning of a president’s first term. Additional,
high points can be seen during periods of perceived foreign policy success or “rally
around the flag” events like post-9/11.


























































































Of course the role that Congress plays in foreign policy success for the president
cannot be denied, if for no other reason than because Congress approves or disapproves
foreign policy legislation. While it is generally assumed that Congress will defer to the
president when it comes to foreign policy making, Congress does have significant
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Constitutional foreign policy making powers, including those powers to declare war and
“raise and support armies.” This is in addition to their advice and consent powers with
regard to treaties and ambassadors. So again, as in domestic policy, when it comes to
foreign policy both the president and Congress can claim significant authority (Lindsay
2003). Here again, we can bring in Richard Neustadt’s (1990) view of the two branches
being “separated institutions sharing power.” This adds to the case that the president
may need additional resources beyond just being president in order to get what he wants
from the legislature.

























































































Just how active is the president in foreign policy? As Figure 4.2 shows, some
presidents are far more legislatively active than others. This figure represents the total
number of foreign policy roll-call votes each year on which the president took a clear
position. This total is calculated using annual reports from CQ Weekly and the Bond and
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Fleisher data set of presidential roll-calls. What we can see from this figure is that the
eighties were certainly a time period when presidents took a significant number of
positions. One possible explanation for this is that this time period includes the end of
the Cold War. This figure also highlights how each president is different, because while
there was a shift upward in the number of roll-calls in the eighties, it was also during
Reagan’s eight year of his term. Reagan, who many believe ended the Cold War, took a
strong role in not only presidential-congressional relations but also in foreign policy.
Another may also be that Congress was taking a more adversarial stance by bringing up
bills which would limit the president’s discretion, like arms control in Latin America.
What is also interesting about this data is the shift downward seen after 1995. Possible
explanations for this include the position Clinton was in during his second term (at the
height of his impeachment) and the relationship between both Clinton and Bush and the
Congresses they faced during their tenure.
This leads to the next relevant issue in the discussion of presidential-
congressional relations and foreign policy. The president does not just deal with an
overall legislature; s/he deals with two separate and distinct chambers. The role of
Congress in the process is further convoluted by the view and general assumption that
one branch (the Senate) is more foreign-policy-oriented and savvy than the other (the
House). The internal differences between the House and Senate are further highlighted
by the fact that the Senate exercises the advice and consent power with regard to foreign
policy matters (like treaties and ambassadors) while the House has no special foreign
policy powers. This helps to substantiate the empirical views used later for analyzing
success in Congress as a whole and in each chamber. That said, it is difficult to see that
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either branch is more acquiescent to the president’s position in foreign policy than the
other (see Figure 4.3). Again, just looking at the levels of foreign policy success in the
House and Senate gives a somewhat cloudy picture of the relationship each branch has
with the president. While it does appear that presidents tend to enjoy more success in the
Senate than the house, the difference is not dramatic. In fact, it is difficult to find any
consistent trend in either the House or the Senate. Of course, individual highs and lows
can be explained, like the drop in House and Senate approval in 1999, when Clinton was
facing as Republican House and was in the middle of his impeachment trial. Additional
factors, like periods of divided government, are also explanations for the variance in
success rates. The potential for the president having different relationships with the
House and Senate (and the role of divided government) will be further fleshed out later in
this chapter (Auerswald 2006; Marshall 2003; Binder 2001).
Methodology and Foreign Policy Approval
Presidential approval is viewed as a “background” factor in influencing legislators
(Neustadt 1990; Ponder and Moon 2003). In both domestic and foreign policy,
presidents tend to care about their popularity with the American public, mainly for the
impact it potentially has on their ability to work with Congress and the administration
(Wittkopf and McCormick 1993; Sobel 2001). Public opinion on foreign policy is
considered both essentially informed and important to the political system (Meernik and
Ault 2001).
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House Foreign Senate Foreign
One general assumption is that key foreign policy events can influence overall
and foreign policy approval in a positive or negative way. An example of this would be
incidents that include a significant use of force (Strom and Simon, 1985; Brody, 1991;
Russett, 1990). Major foreign policy events, such as the Vietnam War, may produce both
short- and long-term effects on presidential approval (Mueller 1973; Edwards, 1981;
Sobel 2001). The Vietnam War is somewhat of a starting point for the literature on the
relationship between foreign policy action taken by the president and how those actions
may impact the public’s view of the president (Mueller 1973). The view of how the
American public responds to foreign policy was highlighted in the previous chapter --
that being that it is not seen as being dominant in setting policy, despite the fact that it is
now considered stable, as well as multifaceted and multidimensional (Sobel 2001; Page
and Shapiro 1983; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987).
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The measure of public opinion used in subsequent analyses in this chapter is the
president’s average yearly public opinion scores in foreign policy. As with the domestic
policy approval measure in chapter three, the foreign policy measure is based on
CBS/New York Times survey which asked “Do you approve or disapprove of the way
[the president] is handing [foreign] policy.” This survey question was asked multiple
times each year between 1965 and 2004.6 Figure 4.4 shows the average annual approval
responses to this question. This figure highlights several well-known facts. Much like
domestic policy, the trend tends to be for presidents to be more successful at the
beginning of their administrations. This notion will be empirically tested. Also, those
“rally around the flag” events can usually be seen in approval ratings, like the spike
George H.W. Bush received during the first Gulf War in 1991 and the post-9/11 jump for
George W. Bush.
6 In order to obtain additional cases to capture at least one term of the Nixon presidency, the foreign policy
public opinion variable was based on Nixon’s average scores on approval ratings on foreign policy issue
areas including Vietnam, World Peace and relations with China and Russia. This was done because the
standard public opinion question was not asked during that time period. However, the standard economic
survey question was asked during the Nixon years and that variable is based on those results.
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As in the previous chapter, the empirical analysis in this chapter begins with an
examination of the role foreign policy approval plays on overall legislative success. The
foreign policy success score was calculated in the same manner previously used to
calculate the domestic foreign policy success score. The score was created by taking the
percentage of victories on foreign policy roll-calls on which the president took a clear
position (as identified by Congressional Quarterly). The number of cases available for
this research was limited by the lack of historic policy-specific polling.
Obtaining support scores can be difficult. Though Congressional Quarterly
publishes overall support scores annually going back to the Eisenhower Administration,
they do not have the historic domestic and foreign policy scores available. Previous
72
researchers have compiled a listing of historic presidential position roll-calls. One such
source, the Bond and Fleisher dataset (available via the Internet) was used to create the
historic data for this research (Fleisher n.d.). The success scores for the years 1971-1994
were calculated using the Bond and Fleisher dataset of congressional votes. Much like
the current data provided by Congressional Quarterly the Bond and Fleisher data set
includes all of the roll-calls that have been identified as having a clear presidential
position. The data also includes a variable indicating whether or not the vote is on
domestic or foreign policy. One difference between these two data sets is that the
Congressional Quarterly scores include nomination votes in the Senate while the Bond
and Fleisher data set does not. Substantively, the omission of nominations has the
potential to present a lower success rate for the Senate than if they were included in the
calculation. The conventional thought is that the Senate typically serves as a “rubber
stamp” on presidential nominations with over 97 percent of all presidential nominees
being confirmed since 1931 (Bell 2002; Common Cause 1977).
I collected and compiled that data for the years 1995-2004. The post-1994 scores
were calculated in the same manner used by CQ by taking the total proportion of
presidential victories compared to the total number of positions taken by the president. To
remain consistent with the Bond and Fleisher data, the omission of nomination votes was
continued in the calculation of the data from 1995-2004.
I include unified government and tenure in office variables in this analysis.
Included in the foreign policy models is an additional variable that was not included in
the domestic policy models: this variable represents the Cold War era. As with any time
of war” one would expect a certain relevance to foreign policy approval and foreign
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policy success. This is mainly due to the potential “rally around the flag” effect that
would cause members of Congress to be more supportive of the president’s foreign
policy agenda. The “rally around the flag” effect is seen as a reflection of Americans
coming together during times of crisis to support the president (Mueller 1973). During
this rallying time, the public hears typically positive messages about the president’s
policies because opinion leaders are less likely to be critical (Brody and Shapiro 1991;
Parker 1995). Originally, the foreign policy models included a category for any period of
active war (i.e. Vietnam and the first Gulf War). This variable was not significant in any
of the models and only included several cases. Instead a measure to capture the Cold
War was included.
The perception is that the end of the Cold War changed both foreign policy
answers and the nature of the questions being asked (Kegley 1993; Prins and Marshall
2001). The post-Cold War threats to the United States are less traditional and in reaction
there has been upheaval in foreign policy making (Nitze 1999). As Prins and Marshall
(2001) contend, “there appears to be no clear agreement among policy makers and
foreign policy elites regarding U.S. Foreign policy priorities” (p. 661). This shift in
foreign policy making allowed for Congress to take a much more active role in national
security and foreign affairs. Bill Clinton is quoted as saying, “Gosh, I miss the Cold
War” (Devroy and Smith 1993), and this single phrase captured the President’s reaction
to congressional assertiveness in foreign affairs. It is because of this shift at the end of
the Cold War that I include a dummy variable to represent those years which were
considered to be a part of the Cold War (1971-1989) as a “1” and the post-Cold War
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years as a “0.” I expect that Cold War-era presidents will be more successful with
Congress than post-Cold War presidents.
For this chapter, the first model used will examine the impact of foreign policy
approval on the president’s overall success. The dependent variable in the regression
model, again, is the Congressional Quarterly measure of overall presidential success, or
the percentage of times a majority of Congress voted with the president on a specific
piece of legislation. The regression model, estimated separately for overall success
within the House and the Senate, is as follows:
Presidential Overall Success Score = a +
ß1 (president’s foreign policy approval) +
ß2 (unified or divided government) +
ß3 (tenure in office) +
ß4 (Cold War) +
ß5 (party %)
The second model, similar to those presented in the previous chapter, examines
the impact of foreign policy approval on presidential success in the foreign policy arena.
Here the dependent variable is based only on those foreign and defense roll-calls on
which the president took a clear position. As was done in Chapter 3, separate models will
be used for overall foreign policy success and for the House and Senate separately. Other
models were tested for this section using a different measure of unified government. In
the chosen model, as was previously stated, unified government is coded as being “0”
during periods of unification and “1” if there is any form of divided government. The
modification of this was tried in the separate House and Senate models. In this attempt,
unification was measured between the president and the branch rather than any form of
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divided government. This measure was not statistically significant in any of the models,
so I continue to use the overall measure of divided government.
The regression model, estimated separately for overall success within the House
and the Senate, is as follows:
Presidential Foreign Policy Success Score = a +
ß1 (president’s foreign policy approval) +
ß2 (unified or divided government) +
ß3 (tenure in office) +
ß4 (Cold War) +
ß5 (party %)
What I expect to find is that when foreign policy success is modeled to include a measure
of foreign policy approval, rather than overall approval, the significance of approval
should be more apparent. This approach, comparing foreign policy success to foreign
policy approval, is one of the key new concepts that take this research beyond what has
been done in the past.
Impact of Foreign Policy Approval on Overall Success
Table 4.1 shows the results from the initial examination of the influence of
foreign policy approval on presidents’ legislative success. The results find that foreign
policy approval is significant in determining overall presidential success. These results
are similar to those in the previous chapter that also found economic approval to be
significant. Unified government and year in office are both significant in the expected
direction. Also, the size of the president’s party in the Senate is again significant in how
successful the president is in both domestic and foreign policy combined.
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Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The reported results are from a one-tailed test.
A Prais-Winsten regression was used to calculate these results
Impact of Foreign Policy Approval on Foreign Policy Success
From here, it is important to take a more focused look to see if foreign policy
approval has a role within the foreign policy arena, specifically when the president takes
a position on a foreign policy bill. What we see in Table 4.2 is dramatically different
from the previous results found for overall success. When looking at presidential success
in foreign policy, it seems that foreign policy approval has no significant impact. Not
only is the variable not statistically significant in any of the cases, but in the case of the
Senate the direction of the variable is in fact wrong. Unified government is significant in
the models for the entire Congress as well as the House model. Tenure in office is
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significant (and signed correctly) for overall congressional success and success in the
House. The level of success in overall foreign policy was higher during the Cold War.
While this variable was not significant for either of the “branch” models, the results for
the congressional model do fit with the literature. The Cold War era translates into
greater success for the president in all policy matters during this period. The Cold War
dichotomy also supports the view that assuming presidential power during both periods (à
la the two presidencies) may be a flawed perspective and that the nature of the
relationship between the president and Congress has changed. The size of the president’s
party is significant in the overall congressional model for both the House and Senate,
though the direction for the House not in the expected direction. The party size measure
is the only factor that is significant for the Senate, indicating that success in foreign
policy in the Senate operates differently than it does in the House.
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Table 4.2: Regression Analysis of Presidential Success in Foreign Policy
Overall Congress House Senate
Foreign Approval 0.177 0.099 0.099
(0.226) (0.375) (0.334)
Tenure in Office -2.896** -5.150** -1.552
(0.925) (1.523) (1.393)
Unified Government 22.844* 25.415+ -0.409
(8.630) (15.046) (9.798)
Cold War 6.718+ 10.818+ 3.633
(3.726) (6.511) (6.053)
Party % House -1.392** -0.980
(0.424) (0.628)
Party % Senate 1.277* 1.266+
(0.508) (0.696)
Constant 60.725* 109.327** 8.303
(26.025) (32.260) (41.014)
Observations 34 34 34
R-squared 0.67 0.46 0.29
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The reported results are from a one-tailed test.
A Prais-Winsten regression was used to calculate these results
Before completely discounting the proposed theory that foreign policy approval
will provide a better measure when examining foreign policy success, I thought it might
be useful to run the same models but use instead the more traditional Gallup measure of
average annual job approval. This additional model will assess the impact of the foreign
policy approval measure and the impact of overall job approval on how successful the
president is in foreign policy legislation. The results shown in Table 4.3 show again that
approval, be it an overall job approval rating or a foreign policy approval rating, has no
significant effect on how successful the president will be with Congress when it comes to
foreign policy. Table 4.3 is included not just to highlight the fact that neither measure
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works, but to add to the discussion the idea that maybe when it comes to foreign policy
matters job approval and the public’s perception of the president just do not matter, even
at the margins.
Table 4.3: Regression Analysis of Presidential Success in Foreign Policy include
Gallup Approval
Overall Congress House Senate
Gallup -0.085 -0.341 0.346
(0.211) (0.353) (0.312)
Tenure in Office -3.039** -5.404** -1.579
(0.929) (1.527) (1.325)
Unified Government 18.760* 19.483 3.117
(8.417) (14.131) (9.543)
Cold War 4.860 7.271 6.498
(4.093) (6.522) (5.869)
Party % House -1.288** -0.867
(0.413) (0.622)
Party % Senate 1.202* 1.007
(0.506) (0.665)
Constant 75.347** 131.439** 5.235
(23.149) (32.564) (33.531)
Observations 34 34 34
R-squared 0.66 0.47 0.34
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The reported results are from a one-tailed test.
A Prais-Winsten regression was used to calculate these results
The inverse relationship found between approval and success in both the foreign
policy approval model and the Gallup model contrasts with what I expected, though
similar relationships between approval and legislative success have been found in
previous models (Shull and Shaw 2004; Prins and Marshall 2001). While none of the
inverse coefficients are statistically significant, a possible explanation for the direction
may be that in some cases (like foreign policy) presidential approval may actually work
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against a president getting his/her way with Congress. Prins and Marshall (2001) come
to a similar conclusion, and I must agree that additional research is needed to really
discover what is going on in this particular situation. Additionally, the results may also
reflect a problem with a small number of cases. In some years there may not be many
foreign policy votes, leading to a great deal of variance in the averages. This “small N”
problem may an additional explanation for lack of results in the foreign policy models.
One interesting observation is that foreign policy approval, while having no
significant relationship to foreign policy success, does have a positive relationship with
overall legislative success. Potentially, foreign policy approval may have an impact on
how well the president does with Congress in all matters, not just foreign policy. This
leads to the question of whether foreign policy approval would have an impact on
domestic policy success. As Table 4.4 shows, foreign policy approval does have a
significant positive relationship with domestic policy success. Not only is it significant
for the entire Congress, but foreign policy approval is significant for the House. Unlike
the foreign approval and foreign policy model for the Senate, tenure in office is now
significant though approval is still insignificant. This helps to explain why foreign policy
approval mattered in the overall model, since it included both domestic and foreign
policy success. However, this leads us to the more difficult question of why foreign
policy approval would matter in domestic policy success and not in foreign policy.
81
Table 4.4: Regression Analysis of Presidential Success in Domestic Policy including
Foreign Approval
Overall House Senate
Foreign Approval 0.460+ 0.658* 0.106
(0.235) (0.321) (0.256)
Tenure in Office -2.911** -2.811* -3.386**
(1.003) (1.299) (1.089)
Unified Government 11.768 25.470+ -9.339
(9.432) (13.215) (8.046)
Cold War -4.382 -2.365 -3.571
(4.922) (7.314) (5.406)
Party % House -0.056 0.528
(0.508) (0.574)
Party % Senate 1.410* 2.152**
(0.643) (0.579)
Constant -25.969 -0.559 -37.413
(28.518) (28.362) (32.276)
Observations 34 34 34
R-squared 0.67 0.58 0.58
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The reported results are from a one-tailed test.
As can be seen in Table 4.4, tenure in office continues to be significant in
predicting success in all three regressions. Though foreign policy approval is significant
in two of the models, it is so at the lowest level. This does not exclude the fact that
public opinion does have an effect on domestic policy success. The significance supports
the view that when a president has high approval in foreign policy, he/she can transfer the
political capital gained in the foreign policy arena to legislative success in domestic
policy. Presidents who have the public’s support in foreign affairs are rewarded with an
extra tool in working with the legislative branch. While this reward may be short-term
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(Marra et al 1990; Mueller 1973) we see that in domestic policy public approval does
have a positive relationship. In contrast, in foreign policy there is no relationship
between public approval and legislative success.
While the results for foreign policy approval on foreign policy success were
somewhat disappointing, there is certain logic to them – especially when taken in context
with what was found in the previous chapter. When it comes to domestic policy, an issue
which we understand the American public have greater interest in, Congress pays
attention to not only what the public thinks but also what the public thinks of the
president in this area. When the public believes the president is doing a good job in
domestic policy, Congress pays attention and is more apt to agree with the president.
Domestic job approval is by no means the deciding in factor for congressional success –
but taken with other ideas like unified government and where the president is in his term,
domestic approval is significant. On the flip side, foreign policy, how the American
public views the job the president is doing has little to do with his/her congressional
success in this policy area. In fact, those factors that were highly significant for domestic
policy were less so for foreign policy. What this difference helps to highlight is the idea
that domestic policy (and presidential success therein) is different from foreign policy.
Though separating the two policy areas is found in the literature, this is typically done in
order to focus on just one policy area. I believe this research just goes to highlight the
need to view these two very different policy areas in a disaggregate manner. The tools
the president has at his/her command in domestic policy -- including public approval --
are different from those s/he has (or in this case does not have) in foreign policy. While
this research does not delve into what -- if any -- additional tools the president does have
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for “getting his way” in the foreign policy arena, some do come to mind like the
president’s ability to write executive orders and agreements that bypass the role of
Congress (Howell 2003; Mayer 2001; Sobel 2001. Foreign affairs is one of the main
three categories where executive orders are used and previous research has found a link
between an increase in the number of executive orders and lower job approval ratings
(Howell 2003; Mayer 2001). If nothing else, these findings help to highlight the need for
additional research in the future -- research which will focus on what tools the president
uses in foreign policy and how these are substantively different from those used in
domestic policy.
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Chapter 5: George W. Bush – Legislation and Job Approval
“…In many ways the easy course for a President, for the administration, is to adopt a
truculent, publicly bold, almost insulting attitude. A President experiences exactly the
same resentments, the same anger, the same kind of sense of frustration almost, when
things like this occur to other Americans, and his impulse is to lash out.”
– Dwight D. Eisenhower (December 2, 1954)
Less than three months after the launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom, President
Bush arrived on the USS Abraham Lincoln off the coast of San Diego to announce to the
American public, “Major combat operations in Iraq have ended. In the battle of Iraq, the
United States and our allies have prevailed” (Bush 2003). This highly staged press event
was well planned and coordinated. Bush arrived in full flight regalia to meet and greet
the sailors who were returning from a stint in the Middle East. The location made a
strong background for the nationally televised speech on the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan. The President was seen on the deck of the Lincoln in from of a large sign
reading “Mission Accomplished.” Shortly after making this speech, the President’s
overall public approval rating was 58 percent. The same poll found 56 percent of the
public approving of the way he was handling “the situation with Iraq.”7 Of course,
combat operations in Iraq have extended well past March 2003 and we have seen the
subsequent shift in public support away from the President and his handling of the
situation with Iraq.
This event epitomizes the unique relationship of President George W Bush with
the American public during his first term. Unique because of the events of Bush’s first
four years in office. President Bush began his stay in the White House after the
7 The survey results reported here were obtained from searches of the iPOLL Databank and other resources
provided by the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. Survey by Gallup,
CNN, USA Today March 14-15, 2003 and based on telephone interviews with a national adult sample of
1,007.
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contentious election of 2000. Despite a somewhat inauspicious beginning, his first term
will forever be associated with the attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq. In the next two chapters, I examine the role that public approval
played in the legislative-executive balance during the first term of George W. Bush’s
presidency. As in the previous chapter, I focus on the president’s success with the
legislative branch. While looking at the president’s legislative agenda will be central to
this examination, other anecdotal examples (like the back and forth between the president
and Congress on the creation of the Department of Homeland Security) will be used to
highlight the perceived relationship between President Bush and the American public.
Legislatively-based measures are inherently useful in the study of the presidency;
because these allow for cross-administration comparisons and more in-depth empirical
research. But, there is also significance to looking at not only the outcomes but also the
details often found inside the relationship between a president and Congress. Outcome-
based measures are statistics based on the end result, such as percentage of in-party
support for the president, or if a bill he supported ended in victory or defeat. This chapter
takes a more detailed legislative approach to the President Bush’s first term as well as
continuing to include outcome based measures. This approach allows us to highlight the
highs and lows of President Bush’s first term and also to examine the impact of 9/11 on
his presidency.
I do not intend to provide a comprehensive examination of the post September
11th decision-making by the Bush presidency. The goal here is to focus on the role 9/11
and the war in Iraq played on the relationship between President Bush, the public, and the
107th and 108th Congress. The examination of this relationship fits into the bigger picture
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of my research by illustrating how the relationship between approval and legislative
success actually plays out during a president’s term.
One could argue that the first four years of Bush’s presidency were much like a
roller-coaster ride – starting out slowly and then quickly gaining speed and momentum.
There have been both highs and lows along the way, as well as a few tight turns. Before
diving into an empirical examination of executive-legislative relation during his first
term, I must frame some of the highs and lows of the first four years of the Bush
presidency. Because this discussion is fairly narrow in focus, looking at just one term of
one specific President, it is important to understand that these descriptions and results are
based on four years worth of information. With that understanding, this is a useful
endeavor because it sheds light on issues that can serve as lessons for future presidents as
well as increase our understanding of the complex relationship that all presidents have
with Congress.
George W. Bush began his presidency under what some would say was a dark
cloud. His victory over Al Gore had been disputed and arguably he had no mandate
going in. Initially, the Republicans held a small margin in Congress which changed in
May 2001, when they would lose the majority in the Senate as Senator James Jeffords of
Vermont left the Republican Party. A defeat in this case is when President Bush took a
clear position on a roll-call and Congress voted the opposite of his position. For all of
2001, forty percent of the roll-calls he took a position on were in fact a call for a “no”
vote. This begins to show that a majority of the legislation coming out of Congress was
on those issues that the President was supporting. In the first eight months of his
administration, Bush had fourteen defeats in Congress, winning 73 percent of his
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legislative battles. Overall he was more successful in the House, losing only six of the 31
votes he took a position on in the House (CQ Weekly 2002 January 12).
This is not to say that all of these were trivial loses. One key loss for the
president was part of the Transportation Appropriations bill. The House voted 285-143
to prohibit the Transportation Department from processing applications from Mexican
motor carriers that wanted to operate in the United States (Benton 2002). The House also
voted in July 2001 to lift curbs on travel to Cuba. An amendment to a Treasury-Postal
spending bill (H.R. 2590) by Jeff Flake (R-AZ) passed by 240-186. The bill, which
would in essence lift restrictions on travel by U.S. citizens to Cuba, was opposed by the
White House which opposed relaxing both travel and trade restrictions (White House
2001). President Bush did have key early victories on education policy — an
administration priority — in 2001, in both the House and Senate. The President did,
however, sustain a loss in the Senate on a more controversial element of his education
agenda, school vouchers. School vouchers were his only education policy loss in the
Senate and one of eight total losses in the Senate before 9/11. Overall, these losses were
mostly in domestic policy — in this time period Bush had only one foreign policy loss
and one economic policy loss. However, President Bush took fewer positions on Senate
roll-calls (21 total pre-9/11) so his percent win record is lower (61 percent) than in the
House.
Presidents’ first years in office tend to be held to the impossible standard set by
Franklin Roosevelt in 1933. Since then, all new Presidents have been held to the
“Hundred Days” standard. Some, like Reagan in 1981, have a very strong legislative
showing in their honeymoon, while others go through the “First Hundred Days” and their
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first year in office without having any major wins (or losses) (Cohen 2004; Brace and
Hinkley 1992; Edwards 1989; Bond and Fleisher 1990). Potentially, Bush’s legislative
success in his first year in office could have been without historical precedent. That
being said, the relationship between the President and legislative branch was transformed
after 9/11. Of his seven defeats in the House in 2001, only one came after 9/11. He held
a similar record in the Senate with only one post-9/11 loss. As figure 5.1 shows, not only
did President Bush have fewer losses after 9/11 in 2001, but he took a position on far
fewer roll-calls.






















Overall, President Bush took a clear position on 77 votes during his first year in
office. Excluding nominations, there were 34 roll-call votes in the Senate and 43 in the
House. His success rate in the Senate was 74 percent, compared to 84 percent in the
House. Three broad policy categories are used by Congressional Quarterly to describe
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legislation: domestic policy, defense and foreign policy, and economic affairs and trade.
In both the House and Senate, Bush was most prolific in the domestic policy arena,
taking a position on a total of 55 roll-call votes. Economic affairs and trade roll-calls had
a total of 25 roll-call votes, while the President only took a position on 7 roll-calls in
defense and foreign policy for both the House and Senate combined. To help to put this
in perspective, President Clinton took a position on 181 roll-call votes (79 in the Senate
and 102 in the House) his first year in office (CQ Weekly 1993). Excluding Senate
nominations, Clinton’s success rate was 83.3 percent in the Senate and 87.3 percent in the
House.
Unlike Clinton, who had a lengthy agenda his first year in office, Bush focused on
only a small set of priorities, like education reforms and tax cuts (Edwards 2006; Cohen
2004, 2006; Jost 2006; Wayne 2006). Bush’s initial domestic agenda concentrated on
these two areas that had been major campaign issues. When the President arrived in he
found a much more partisan environment than he had previously experienced (CQ
Congress 2006). In some ways, this partisan environment impacted his choice to focus
on a few key initiatives, like No Child Left Behind, early on in his administration. After
9/11, the administration’s priorities shifted to combating terrorism and the “Global War
on Terror.” One possible explanation for the decrease in presidential position-taking
after 9/11 is this shift in priorities.
Overall, President Bush took fewer positions in his first year in office than his
counterparts in the eighties and nineties. Of course, it is a difficult comparison to make
when just looking at the total number of positions – even more so when one takes into
account the events of 9/11. What is generally accepted is that before September 2001,
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President Bush had met with moderate success in Congress (Thurber 2006; Jost 2006;
Wayne 2006). The legislation that immediately followed 9/11 was presented to a
Congress that was, for the time being, more politically unified. In the first few months
after the terrorist attacks, the executive branch certainly became the central focus of
power with many historians and political scientists viewing the Bush administration as a
return to the “imperial presidency” (Schlesinger 2003; Bettelheim 2002). The White
House took a strong arm to Congress, insisting on blanket authority to pursue its policies
and making a variety of unilateral decisions, like those regarding the prosecution of terror
suspects.
The pre-post 9/11 dichotomy is also evident in Bush’s approval ratings from his
first year in office. The election issues that complicated his initial legislative agenda
affected his early job approval ratings. When he took office in January 2001, President
Bush had an average 57 percent approval rating (Gallup 2001). His overall approval
would stay above 50 percent throughout the spring and summer of his first year. A
Gallup Poll from the beginning of September 2001 found his job approval to be at 51
percent, his lowest rating to that point, but after the terrorist attacks there was a 35 point
jump to 86 percent approval in a poll conducted September 14-16, 2001. As Figure 5.2
shows, the president’s approval ratings took a dramatic increase after the terrorist attacks
and remained above 79 percent for the remainder of 2001.
The count of legislation pre and post-9/11 does not tell the whole story of how
9/11 influenced Bush’s first term. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, there was an
obvious “rally around the flag” effect that influenced how Congress dealt with the
President (Erikson, Mackuen and Stimson 2002; Baum 2002; Meernik 1993; Mueller
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1973). This effect is best described as when Congress and a large portion of the
American public flock to the president’s side after a highly visible international event
(Meernik 1993). Previously identified “rally around the flag” events include the Cuban
Missile Crisis and the first Persian Gulf War. The rally effect for President Bush also
occurred in his relationship with the American public as seen in his very quick jump in
job approval. Between September 11, 2001 and December 31, 2002 more than half of the
presidential statements and press releases, photo ops and radio addresses dealt with
terrorism at home or abroad (Wayne 2006).







































































Source: CNN/Gallup Poll average responses to "Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling his job as President?" from 1/1/2001 - 12/31/2001
One telling example of the impact of 9/11 on the Bush administration’s
relationship with Congress is in the type of legislation that was passed in the end of the
107th session. Of the votes which President Bush took a position on after 9/11, over 50
percent have some substantive relation to the “War on Terror” or terrorism recovery.
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Several of these roll-calls included pieces of key “terrorism” legislation like H.R. 3162,
more commonly known as the Patriot Act. The creation of the Transportation Security
Administration (H.R. 3150 and later PL 107-71) was another piece of legislation that the
President took a position on and in turn was a “win” for the President, with a 286-139
vote in support of his “yea” position. Both the TSA and Patriot Act bills were domestic
victories for Bush. This categorization is key in seeing the shift in substance after 9/11.
Previously in the House, the President took a position on domestic bills dealing with
education (No Child Left Behind), faith-based initiatives, and the patients’ bills of rights.
Afterwards, only two of the domestic roll-calls in the House (H.R. 4626 on Farm Security
and H.R. 1 on No Child Left Behind) had no link to either 9/11 recovery or the “War on
Terror.”
Of course, legislation of this nature is to be expected, given the pertinent issues at
the time. No one would be shocked that the issue of homeland security suddenly came to
the top of the congressional agenda. The Congress gave the president more latitude than
would have been expected in a more typical first year in office (Wayne 2006). In his first
and second years of office, Congress enacted most of the president’s items dealing with
homeland security and terrorism. Legislation passed in the remainder of the 107th
Congress also included the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, significant
appropriations for 9/11 recovery, and a Use of Force Resolution. This early acceptance
of the president’s agenda is obvious in the overall passage rate of foreign policy and
defense legislation in the last part of 2001 and 2002.
While I include the creation of the Department of Homeland Security as a win for
the President, the circumstances behind its creation are an interesting example of how by
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2002 the “rally around the flag” effect had begun to fade in Congress. Here we see
Congress for the first time since 9/11 really began to return to acting in a more partisan
(and dare I say typical) manner rather than just following the lead of the president in
matters of national security. President Bush initially opposed the creation of the
Department of Homeland Security. He had initially set up the Office of Homeland
Security within the White House right after 9/11. This office, Bush argued, was able to
provide the needed security for the nation. The creation of a new cabinet department was
not in the administration’s plan. In a March 2002 press briefing, Ari Fleisher said
“creating a Cabinet department doesn’t solve anything” (White House 2002). By June
2002, the White House reversed its position and offered a proposal to create a formal
department. While the bill easily passed the House, it stagnated in the Senate where
Democrats pushed for the new department’s employees to have the right to union
representation. Bush threatened to veto any legislation that did not have flexibility in
hiring, pay and personnel management. The bill (PL 107-295) eventually passed in the
Senate, after the midterm elections of 2002 where Bush and the Republicans won Senate
control. The final version allowed the new department to write its own personnel rules.
The Bush Administration’s eventual victory in the creation of the Department of
Homeland Security highlights an increasing back-and-forth between the president and
Congress on even those issues dealing with terrorism. Another example of a “loss/win”
for Bush in the foreign policy area was in the 9-11 Commission. In July, the President
initially opposed the Roemer Amendment (H.AMDT.566) which proposed the creation of
an independent commission. Despite his opposition, the amendment passed. This was
one of five foreign policy defeats for Bush in 2002. By September 2002, with growing
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political pressure for an investigation and strong public outcries by the families of 9/11
victims, Bush dropped his opposition to the commission. By November, the bill had
passed the House and Senate and was signed into law by President Bush (PL107-306).
In 2002, President Bush took a position on 61 roll-call votes. This is a twenty
percent decline from the 77 roll-call positions he took in 2001. Bush was twice as active
in the House, taking a position on 40 votes, compared to only 21 in the Senate (see Figure
5.3). One potential cause for the difference between the two chambers is that in 2002 the
House was controlled by Republicans and created more legislation of which the President
was in favor. In the Senate, President Bush only took one domestic policy position –
which resulted in a loss for the President. H.R. 2646 (Senate roll-call vote 30) was a
farming bill (Farm Security and Rural Investment Act) that the President took a “no” vote
position on. The bill passed the Senate with a 58-40 vote and was later signed into law.
The President enjoyed more success with the Senate in foreign policy; the two roll-calls
on which he took a positive position were both passed. Included in this two bill victory
is the Joint Resolution approving the use of force in Iraq. This bill, and the lasting
implications of the war in Iraq on the Bush administration, will be discussed further in
this and the subsequent chapter. Compared to domestic and foreign policy, President
Bush was most active in the Senate with regards to economic policy. Here the President
took a position on 17 votes and had 13 victories.
On the other side of the Capital, the President was more active in all three policy
areas. Of the 40 roll-call votes he took a position on, 11 were in domestic policy, 13 in
foreign policy, and 16 in economic affairs. The President had few defeats in economic
and domestic policy (one in each area), but had five defeats in foreign policy, dropping
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his percent victory in this area to 61 percent in the House (compared to 100 percent in the
Senate.) The previously mentioned Department of Homeland Security is considered to
be on of the “wins” for Bush in the House and Senate in foreign policy. Also included in
his House foreign policy wins are the Iraq use of force resolution and the September 11th
commission. The domestic policy agenda still existed, but terrorism and the “War on
Terror” were in the front and center of the president’s agenda. As Stephen Wayne (2006)
so clearly states: “For Bush, the issue was terrorism, pure and simple” (78).
While a good portion of the House foreign policy roll-calls related to the “War on
Terror”, the substance of the House domestic roll-calls was focused on non-terror issues.
One great example of this is H.R. 4965 – the ban on partial birth abortions. Bush took a
“yea” vote position on this bill that passed the House 274-151. This bill is an interesting
case because it, like the roll-calls surrounding the 9/11 Commission, shows the president
losing unified support from Congress. On domestic policy issues, we see the classic
partisan divide occurring in Congress. On H.R. 4695, the president received strong in-
party support – with 96 percent of Republicans voting in favor of the bill. On the
opposite side, the partisan divide is clearly seen, with 68 percent of Democrats voting
against the bill. In 2002, we begin to see a return to non-terror related roll-calls (and
subsequent votes). This is unlike the last three months of 2001 when a large portion of
the votes in the House and Senate, including domestic policy votes, were related to
terrorism and were wins for the president. The partisan divisions that the president faced
when he came to power began to show again in 2002. The strong job approval ratings for
the President in the post-9/11 days were also beginning to fade.
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When 2002 began, 84 percent of the country approved of the job the president
was doing. By the end of the year this number would drop to 63 percent. The president
also declined in his job approval ratings with regard to the “War on Terror.” Figure 5.4
shows the President’s average monthly general job approval rating and his rating for the
“War on Terror”. Because terrorism-related questions were not asked by Gallup on a
monthly basis, these figures were calculated using the average Gallup and CBS News
approval rating. Interestingly, regular questions on terrorism were asked only in 2002
and were replaced by more regular polling on Iraq in 2003 and 2004. The Gallup figures
are based on the question: “Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is
handling...U.S. (United States) military action abroad to fight terrorism?” The CBS
News data is based on the question: “Do you approve or disapprove of the way George
W. Bush is handling the campaign against terrorism?” The figure shows a slow decline
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in the President’s approval ratings in both job approval and terrorism. Even his lowest
overall average in December 2002 (62.5 percent) was still higher than his pre-9/11
average, which never peaked above 60 percent. What we do see here is the possibility
that the “rally around the flag” bump the president received in those days following the
terrorist attack began to fade in 2002. We will see this gradual decline in job approval
continue throughout his first term – we will also see the president become more active in
his position-taking in his last two years in office.
































































Source: General Approval - CNN/Gallup ; Terrorism Approval CNN/Gallup and CBS News
The war in Iraq was another turning point during Bush’s first four years. If it
were possible to split Bush’s first term into two different portions, like 2001, it would be
into the pre / post Iraq phases. By the end of 2002, the focus on terrorism and national
security began to shift to include Iraq. The administration’s Iraq policy would continue
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to be the focus until the end of Bush’s first term (and potentially longer, but this is the
time constraint for this research). Again, this dissertation’s aim is not to chronicle our
Iraq policy. Instead, it is to highlight some of the significant events in the first term of
President Bush and discuss his overall relationship with Congress and the American
public, discussing how the war in Iraq impacted his relationship with Congress and the
American public.
In the summer of 2002, the vice president and other administration officials began
voicing the need for military action with Iraq. By mid-September, President Bush began
articulating and speaking out on Iraq, Saddam Hussein, and the new “National Security
Strategy.” This strategy made the case for taking preemptive action against threats to
U.S. national security (Baker 2006). The new “Bush Doctrine” clearly stated that the
United States would act “preemptively” when necessary in order to “prevent or forestall
hostile acts by our adversaries” (Jost 2007). Throughout the remainder of 2002, the Bush
administration took several steps toward what seemed like an inevitable war with Iraq.
Bush, through then Secretary of State Powell, worked with the UN Security Council to
re-allow weapons inspectors in Iraq. Also, there was the previously mentioned use of
force resolution (PL 107-243), which Congress approved in October.
Foreign policy, mainly the War on Terror and Iraq, continued to dominate the
Bush agenda in 2003. Legislatively, the president was active in both foreign and
domestic policy. Figure 5.5 shows the number of positions taken by President Bush in
2003. President Bush took a position on 47 Senate roll-calls and 55 in the House.
Comparing just the number of positions in 2003 to 2002, the president increased his
position-taking by 70 percent. He had an 87 percent success rate in the House and a 75
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percent in the Senate. While foreign policy may have dominated the president’s agenda,
the area he was most active in position- taking was domestic policy. Here he took 60
positions (House and Senate combined) on a variety of issues including ”partial birth
abortion” and cloning. The cloning bill was a win for Bush with the House passing
legislation prohibiting human cloning with a 241-155 vote. In the final vote (roll-call
39), Bush received strong support from Republicans with only 16 of 214 Republicans
voting against the bill. This bill also received some support from Democrats with 23
percent voting with the president. Another big win domestically for the president was the
ban on partial birth abortions. The final votes in the House (Roll no. 242) and Senate
(Roll no. 42) were both in support of the president’s position. The bill, which became
Public Law 108-105, received strong support from Republicans in both the House and
Senate. In fact, only two Republican senators voted against the Senate version of the bill.
His success in foreign policy was a bit more mixed, losing three votes in the House
including two amendments to a transportation bill dealing with Cuba that the president
opposed. The president also had four foreign policy defeats in the Senate, including two
roll-calls dealing with Iraq funding. These two losses are significant as none of the other
foreign policy losses had to deal with Iraq or the War on Terror. The first was a motion
to table an amendment dealing with small businesses that was attached to a larger Iraq
appropriations bill. The vote to table passed the Senate 69-29, despite the President
supporting the amendment. The second Iraq loss was on the Bayh Amendment (No.
1871), which required that funds for reconstruction in Iraq be used for certain purposes.
The president opposed the amendment and, despite strong in-party support, the
amendment passed 51-47 with eight Republicans voting in favor of the amendment.
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Iraq would dominate much of the president’s foreign policy and his public agenda
in both 2003 and 2004. In the spring of 2003, Iraq seemed to be a high point for the
administration, with several key successes early on. The official war itself only lasted a
total of three weeks. Originally, the Pentagon plan had been to withdraw most of the
U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of 2003 – however this plan was quickly changed when
an upsurge of violence occurred at the end of the year (CQ Weekly 2006). The potential
impact of this initial success and then increase in violence (and American causalities) can
be seen in Bush’s approval ratings for 2003. Early on in the year, and shortly after the
president declared an end to combat operations, his overall job approval rating and his
approval rating for the way he was handing the “situation in Iraq” were in the high 50
percent range. In fact, both April ratings reached the average high for the year: 70.8
percent overall job approval and 76 percent Iraq approval. April was also the month that
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featured the “symbolic” collapse of Saddam Hussein, with the U.S. Marines helping Iraqi
citizens pull down his statue in central Baghdad. The short upturn at the end of the year
for both approval areas corresponds with the capture of Saddam Hussein by U.S. forces
on December 14, 2006 (CNN 2003). While his overall job approval for 2003 never
dipped below the 50 percent mark, it certainly was a downward trend from the end of
2004. This decline would continue throughout the end of his first term.

























Source: General Approval - CNN/Gallup ; Terrorism Approval CNN/Gallup and CBS News
In the last year in his first term, President Bush faced not only his lowest public
approval ratings to date but he was also beginning to lose ground with Congress. By
2004, the president was not only less productive with legislation but was also less
successful. President Bush took a position on only 18 Senate roll-call votes, only two of
which were in foreign policy, and only three of which were in economic policy. All of
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the economic and foreign policy votes were victories for the president, but he suffered
defeats on nine of the 13 domestic policy votes. In the Senate, Bush’s overall success
rate was a 50 percent, which is significantly lower than his success rate for the three
previous years. President Bush faired somewhat better in the House. Not only did he
take more positions on House roll-calls (see figure 5.7) but he was more successful
overall – a 74 percent success rate. In foreign policy, Bush was successful on 50 percent
of the 8 votes he took a position on, losing those dealing with base closures, Cuban
travel, and U.S. aid to Saudi Arabia.






















A domestic loss for the President, in both the House and Senate, was the Gay
Marriage Constitutional Amendment. The bill was seen by many as part of a broader
Republican campaign strategy. In the Senate, proponents of the measure failed to get the
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necessary 60 votes needed to invoke cloture and bring the measure to a vote. The cloture
vote, which was supported by President Bush, received 45 Republican votes and 3
Democratic. A majority of Democrats (43) and six Republicans voted against the
cloture. The bill was not expected to win; despite this it was pushed by Republicans
hoping the issue would continue to garner national attention in the election year (CNN
2004).
Overall, 2004 was less successful for President Bush than the previous three
years. As Figure 5.8 shows, President Bush was most successful in “getting his way”
with Congress in 2003 which was followed by marked decline down in 2004. While he
was continually more successful with the House than the Senate, the decline from 2003 to
2004 occurred in both chambers. While the Republicans controlled the House throughout
his entire first term, the balance of the Senate was somewhat more tenuous. The 107th
Senate began was split 50-50 with the Democrats in control until January 20, 2001 when
Richard Cheney was sworn in as vice president, thereby becoming president of the
Senate. This shifted control of the Senate to the Republicans. The Republicans
controlled the Senate until May 24, 2001 when Sen. Jeffords (VT) announced he would
switch from Republican to Independent status and that he would caucus with the
Democrats. This change caused a switch in the control of the Senate back into
Democratic hands. The November 2002 election replaced appointed Sen. Jean Carnahan
(D-MO) with Sen. James Talent (R-MO), shifting the balance again back to the
Republicans, but since the Senate was out of session there was no need for
reorganization. The Republicans remained in control of the Senate through out the 108th
session with a 51-48 (1 independent) majority. While we will further explore the role of
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party control on Bush’s success in the next chapter, what this balance of power in the
Senate does begin to show us is that even when the Republicans held a majority – it was a
small majority and much less so than the majority held in the House. While President
Bush’s success rate dropped for the Senate between 2003 and 2004, it is important to note
(as Figure 5.8 shows) that he also declined in the House during this same time period. For
both chambers, 2003 was the peak of his legislative success during his first term.
Comparatively, George W. Bush’s first term was one of the most successful presidencies
in the past thirty years. His overall success rate (for the House and Senate combined) for
the 2001 and 2002 is the highest ranked among all Presidents since 1971. Even 2004,
which was the low point in Bush’s first term, was in the upper half of Presidential success
rates.




























President Bush endured declining public approval ratings in 2004. For the first
time since the beginning of his presidency, President Bush’s job approval rating fell
below 55 percent and stayed under that mark for the rest of his first term. In the summer
of 2004, Bush’s approval ratings hit a first term low for him, averaging between 47 and
50 percent. As Figure 5.9 shows, his lows in both overall job approval and approval for
Iraq were lowest in July and climbed slightly higher as the fall progressed. In fact in
October, just one month before the 2004 Presidential election, Bush’s average job
approval rating was at 50.28 percent. A month later he went on to be elected to a second
term with 51 percent of the popular vote and 53 percent of the Electoral College.

























Source: General Approval - CNN/Gallup ; Terrorism Approval CNN/Gallup and CBS News
When President Bush’s job approval rating for his entire first term is examined,
there are several observable high points. First, there is the post-9/11 increase in job
approval in 2001. After this jump up in approval, which was the high point of his entire
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first term, there is a decline until April of 2003, when there is another spike in his job
approval. As previously mentioned, this was around the same time as the announcement
of the end of combat operations in Iraq. His approval ratings around the end of 2004
mirror those from the beginning of his administration in 2001. During both time periods,
Bush’s job approval ratings were around the 53 percent mark. However, the beginning of
his administration is different because his ratings never dipped below 50 percent job
approval, while we see this occur twice (in monthly averages) in 2004. President Bush is
by no means the first President to have job approval ratings in the 50 percent range. In
fact several Presidents, including Carter and George H.W. Bush, had average annual
approval ratings below 50 percent in the fourth year in office. Presidents Reagan and
Clinton had job approval ratings in the 54-55 percent range in their fourth year in office,
and both were reelected to a second term.















































































So what generalization can be made from looking at the legislative successes and
approval ratings from George W. Bush’s first term in office? First and in my view most
important is the impact of 9/11 and the war in Iraq on his presidency and quite possibly
his historical legacy. Not only did Bush frame most of his first four years in office in
terms of the broad War on Terrorism, but the impact these events had on his job approval
and legislative success are key. We see a strong “rally around the flag” effect in job
approval occur in the months following 9/11. In Congress, we see an initially strong bi-
partisan support for the President, both domestically and in foreign policy. This support,
both in job approval and in legislative success, begins to decline in his first term. The
information provided here gives a nice first look at the President’s first term. The shift
in focus from domestic legislation to foreign and terrorism legislation is to be expected in
2002. Legislation dealing with traditionally Republican issues, like abortion and gay
marriage, showed how the support for the President on some issues was still dependent
on party lines. The “rally” effect may have only occurred on those issues that related
directly to terrorism, leaving behind across-the-aisle support for issues which would be
considered to be Republican.
Captured here are some of the high and low public approval points of the first four years
of his administration. Obvious is the impact that the events of 9/11 had on Bush’s job
approval rating. From his high point at the end of 2001, there is a steady decline in job
approval with jumps up occurring near foreign policy events like the beginning of the war
in Iraq. The next step is to take a closer look his legislative successes and to fit these
results into the broader discussion of the relationship between success with Congress and
approval by the American public.
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Chapter 6: The Two Bush Presidencies
“I'm the decider, and I decide what is best.”
– George W. Bush 43rd President of the United States8
The framers of the Constitution neither expected nor wanted the president to be a
legislative draftsman (Wayne 2006). Yet throughout U.S. history we have seen
presidents who take a strong legislative role. Wilson and the League of Nations (though
a failure in the Senate), Roosevelt and the New Deal, and Johnson’s civil rights and Great
Society programs are all times when the White House pushed a legislative agenda. The
events of 9/11 saw a shift of power back to the president, or as James Lindsay (2003)
says, “. . . the pendulum of power swung sharply back toward the White House” (pg
537). As discussed in the previous chapter, President Bush did not enjoy high marks
from the American public during the beginning of his administration. In fact, the only
“modern” president to face lower job approval ratings in his first eight months of office
was Gerald Ford (Smith 2002; Gallup 2001). In the aftermath of 9/11, however, Bush’s
approval ratings soared. In this chapter two issues are examined. First, I examine the
extent to which this increase in public support affected his legislative success. More
specifically, is there are relationship between presidential victories in Congress and
presidential approval ratings during the Bush administration?
The second issue this chapter examines is the relative success of President Bush
in foreign versus domestic policy. The Bush administration is an interesting case in
point. We see an initial shift in power (and support per se) to the president after the
8 The White House (2006). President Bush Nominates Rob Portman as OMB Director and Susan Schwab
for USTR. April 18, 2006. Retrieved 26, 2007, from
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/04/20060418-1.html
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events of 9/11. This shift is marked by high approval ratings and bi-partisan support in
Congress. Over time, President Bush’s approval ratings and bipartisan support began to
deteriorate. The previous chapter discussed in broad terms President Bush’s successes
and losses in Congress during his first term. I begin this chapter by returning to one of
the traditional perspectives on presidential relations with Congress in the foreign and
domestic policy arenas, the two presidencies theory. While this theory established by
Wildvasky (1966) has faced increasing criticism, it does accurately reflect the policy
making dynamics in certain political contexts, so it is useful to look to see how President
Bush would (or would not) fit into this view. In the remainder of the chapter, I test the
previous conjecture that job approval and policy type are statistically linked to success by
empirically looking at legislation from President Bush’s first term. Two main models
will be used in this examination – the first looking at the influence of approval, policy
type and other factors on a presidential “victory” and the second looking to see if
approval or policy type influences both in- and out-of-party support for the president.
George W. Bush and the Two Presidencies
Though President Bush did not necessarily enter office with plans to be a foreign
policy president (Hamilton 2006), foreign policy not only dominated his first term but
also set the framework for how his entire administration is and will be defined.
Wildavsky’s original contention is that there are in fact “two presidencies” in the United
States, one for foreign policy and one for domestic policy (Wildavsky 1966). The basic
understanding here is that the president should, and in Wildavsky’s view does, receive
greater support from Congress with regards to foreign policy. In chapters two and four, I
discussed some of the criticisms of this theory and how it is relevant to this research –
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mainly in providing a framework to think of foreign policy differently from domestic
policy. I think it is a useful endeavor to look at the first four years of the President
Bush’s presidency in this framework. Given his strong focus on foreign policy (and the
atmosphere of the War on Terror), Bush’s presidency may fit the description of a “two
presidencies” president. The current literature provides a framework for how to go about
this examination.
The current methodology when examining the “two presidencies” begins with
those roll-call votes where the president took a clear position (Conley 1997; Schraufnagel
& Shellman 2001) and the same will be done here using Congressional Weekly Reports
from 2001 to 2004 to obtain the list of votes that President Bush took a clear position on.
Roll-call votes will be classified as being either domestic policy, foreign/defense policy,
or as an intermestic issue (see Conley 1997). Conley (1997) defines intermestic issues as
those with possible consequences for both domestic and foreign policy, like trade policy
or immigration. I will use these categories but add an additional one– terror issues.
Terror issues are defined as those linked to either the “War on Terror” or Iraq.
There is the broad terror issues category – and then within those issues which are
“foreign terror” – those having clear foreign policy implications – and “domestic terror”
– those having clear domestic policy implications. An obvious example of a “terror
issue” would be H.J. Resolution 64 that was the use of force resolution that passed the
House on September 14, 2001. This resolution was an authorization for the president to
“use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons
he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred
on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent
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any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations,
organizations, or persons” (Congressional Record Online 2001). This roll-call vote is
coded in the data set as being in the “foreign terror” category. Roll-calls previously
coded by Congressional Quarterly as being economic were folded into either one of the
four set categories depending on the nature of the legislation. For example, a domestic
spending bill whose purpose was to aid in the economic recovery after 9/11 (H.R. 3090)
would be coded as “domestic terror.” Roll-calls dealing with the war in Iraq were also
coded as terror votes. This is because military intervention in Iraq was framed as part of
the broader War on Terror (Jost 2006; CNN 2005; CNN 2003) .
The inclusion of “terror issues” makes this take on the “two presidencies”
different from previous research. Another difference is that for these purposes I will not
be using a conflict threshold. The conflict threshold is done by excluding roll-calls from
the analysis that receive over 90 percent support in the total vote (Conley 1997; Fleisher
et al 2000; Schraufnagel & Shellman 2001). These roll-calls are included because many
of the post-9/11 roll-calls, like the Patriot Act, were passed with an overwhelming
majority of both chambers. The substance of these roll-calls and their focus on terror is
more important to the discussion than concern that those roll-calls with strong bipartisan
support may skew the findings.
President George W. Bush took a position on 289 roll-call votes during his first
term. Of those votes, 179 were domestic policy; 29 foreign policy; 35 were intermestic
issues and 46 were terror issues. Votes were only counted in one of the four categories.
Within the terror category, 24 dealt with domestic terrorism and 22 were of a more
foreign policy terror nature. As Table 6.1 shows, the president was more successful in
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domestic policy than in foreign policy. These simple findings would argue that President
Bush does not fit the “two presidencies” mold. When including the intermestic issues,
the president was nearly equally successful in domestic policy and in mixed domestic and
foreign. What is most interesting however, is how successful the president was in the
terror area. His overall success rate was a 91.3 percent – much higher than any other
policy area. President Bush did not have a single loss in those terror issues focusing on
domestic policy. His success rate in foreign terror issues (83 percent) was still
considerably higher than either domestic, foreign or intermestic issues. These results
begin to show us a potentially new type of “two presidencies” – one for issues dealing
with terrorism and one for all other issues. In fact, the combined success rate for all non-
terror issues was 75 percent for all four years, compared to the 91.3 percent success rate
for terror issues. One can begin see that, at least from 2001-2004, President Bush was
more successful with Congress on those issues linked to the War on Terror.
113
Table 6.1: Presidential Success by Policy Area
Total Victories Total Losses Success Rate
Domestic – non terror 138 41 77.09
Foreign– non terror 19 10 65.52
Intermestic– non terror 27 8 77.14
Terror – overall 42 44 91.30
Terror – Domestic 22 0 100.00
Terror – Foreign 20 4 83.33
Table 6.2 shows the average partisan support the president received by policy
area. As one would expect, the support for President Bush was much greater for
Republicans than for Democrats. Here we see that the two presidencies does occur
among Democrats based on the average support given for foreign versus domestic policy.
The Democrats gave greater support to President Bush in both foreign and intermestic
policy issues. This fits the previous findings by Fleisher and Bond (1988) that
Republican presidents tend to receive greater support on foreign policy issues from
Democrats. Republicans gave the highest level of support for domestic policy issues,
which is predictable, given the clear partisan divide on issues like partial birth abortion.
While a strong majority of Republicans supported the president in foreign and intermestic
issues, the support was less than that seen in domestic policy. Republicans were less
likely to vote along strict party lines on issues like trade and base closures. In all three of
the “traditional” policy areas, there was never a majority of Democratic support and
always a strong majority of Republican support.
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Table 6.2: Average Presidential Support by Policy Area
Democratic Support Republican Support
Domestic– non terror 27.68 88.03
Foreign– non terror 32.61 78.94
Intermestic– non terror 38.43 81.56
Terror 53.58 87.43
Terror – Domestic 64.08 85.12
Terror – Foreign 43.95 89.53
The results in Table 6.2 also support the view that instead of a traditional “two
presidencies”, President Bush has two presidencies in terror versus non-terror issues.
One of Wildavsky’s rationales behind the original two presidencies thesis was that during
the Cold War and subsequent threat of nuclear attack the president had a distinct
advantage over Congress because the need for secrecy in international information
(Wildvasky 1966; Fleisher et al 2000). Another perception was that the country needed
to speak with a singular voice because doing otherwise might undermine the country’s
position in the world and be a threat to national security (Fleisher et al 2000). These
same rationales behind the original two presidencies can again be seen in terrorism two
presidencies. As for the uniform voice for the country, historically during times of crisis
the president is the one whom the public turns too to speak for the nation as a whole. The
threat of another terrorist attack and the U.S. needing a response to 9/11 gave President
Bush an initial advantage over Congress. This is supported by the fact that the president
received greater bi-partisan support in terrorism issues than in other issues. When
looking at all terror issues combined, a majority of Democrats and Republicans support
the President. In domestic policy terror issues, an average of 64 percent of Democrats
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supported Bush and 85 percent of Republicans. Again, we see that much like foreign
policy in the Cold War where Presidents were able to garner support from both sides of
the aisle, in Bush’s first term terror policy operated in a similar fashion. Those votes
linked to terrorism found support from both sides of the aisle. The next closest area
would be those intermestic issues that combine domestic and foreign policy. The
findings in this area support those previously found by Conley (1997).
Previous research typically focuses on either the House or the Senate to examine
the two presidencies thesis. The tables above are based on combined data from both
chambers. Table 6.3 shows the overall success rate by chamber. Here we see some
variance between the House and Senate. The president was more successful in the Senate
on foreign and intermestic issues; in contrast, he had greater success in domestic policy in
on the House side. The House was controlled by the Republicans throughout the entire
time period, while the balance of the Senate was back and forth between the Democrats
and Republicans. The size of the Republican majority in the House was greater
compared to the majority in the Senate. In partisan terms this makes sense, with a
majority of Republicans in the House supporting the president’s domestic agenda,
controlling a majority would produce greater success rates. Intermestic issues, which can
split Republicans over issues like trade policy, had less success in the House than in the
Senate, where the president could receive some support from Democrats across the aisle.
Even looking at the non-terrorism roll-calls, the president was more successful in the
House (80.69 percent compared to 68 percent) highlighting the impact of having greater
Republican support in one chamber compared to the other.
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Table 6.3: Presidential Success by Policy Area – by Chamber





Terror – Domestic 100 100
Terror - Foreign 80 84.62
The results of Table 6.3 also support the split between terror and non-terror policy
areas. Again, the president has greater success on those roll-call votes related to
terrorism. Both chambers gave President Bush strong support on terrorism issues,
especially those relating to homeland security issues. From this analysis we begin to see
a picture of the Bush administration being divided two parts: the first is more of what we
have come to recognize in presidential-congressional relations where partisanship and
party control of the Congress and White House impact the end outcome; the second,
however, is unique to President Bush.
In the Senate, Bush’s overall success rate for non-terror issues was 68 percent
compared to 89 percent for terrorism. Similarly, in the House his terror success rate was
greater than his non-terror success rate (80.69 percent). We can make the case that Bush’s
first term represents a terror presidency – where we see both Republicans and Democrats
supporting the President on issues which are framed in a national security / War on
Terror context. While the two presidencies may be “dead,” what we see in Bush’s first
term is a new manner of “two presidencies” not so much in the domestic versus foreign
but in those issues relating to terrorism and all other issues. These findings on the role of
terror issues support the need for further analysis – to see not only what additional factors
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influence success for President Bush, but also examine the impact of terror issues on
Bush’s success.
V is for Victory
What constitutes a victory of the President? Victory here is identified when
President Bush took a clear position on a roll-call vote (as identified by Congressional
Quarterly) and a majority of the House or Senate voted in agreement with his position.
When President Bush took a “no” position on a specific roll-call vote, and a majority of
the chamber voted “no” then that would constitute a clear victory for the President. Each
vote is calculated for the chamber it took place in. To put this in context, in his first term
President Bush took a clear position on 291 roll-call votes. Of these 291 votes, 226 were
“victories”. Another way to look at this is that President Bush had an overall 77.7
percent success rate with Congress. This success rate changes by year, with 2003
actually being the most successful for his first four years (81.4% success) and 2004 being
the least successful (65.4% success). The success rate is also important because it helps
to highlight the difference between the two chambers of Congress. In terms of straight
wins and losses, President Bush was more successful in the House than in Senate. This is
not unexpected, given the partisan composition of both chambers.
These models not only look at which chamber was more likely to produce a
victory for the president but also the impact of job approval and policy type on the
likelihood of victory. The dependent variable for each model will be if the roll-call vote
was a victory or not. As with the previous discussion of the Bush’s two presidencies,
these models include all of those roll-call votes that President Bush took a position on in
his first term.
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What factors may make victory more likely? First, as discussed above, is the
idea that the chamber can make a difference. Percentage-wise, President Bush was more
successful in the House than in the Senate (over all four years). The first regression in
each model will include an indicator of where the vote took place – 1 for “House” and 0
for “Senate”. The expected relationship here is positive, reflecting greater success in the
House than Senate. The second and third part will split the votes into either House or
Senate votes, allowing for greater examination of the effect of each chamber. Two policy
types are of interest here and this variable drives two of the models. The first model
includes the idea that the President was more success in domestic and economic policy
than in foreign policy. This idea is measure by a 0 for “domestic / economic” policy and
a 1 for “foreign policy.” The third model includes a measure for terror policy. These
policies were discussed in the previous section and are measured for these regressions by
a 0 for “non-terror” and a 1 for “terror policy”. Here we see issues that may previously
have been considered to be intermestic coded as being either foreign or domestic policy
as identified by CQ. This was done to ensure there be enough variables in each category
since the president took so few positions in some years. Given what has been previously
discussed about the overall support for the president on terror policy the expected result is
that terror policies are more likely to obtain a victory for the president than non-terror
policies. Every model also includes three variables to control for each individual year in
Bush’s first term.
Lastly, I include a measure of job approval of the president. For these models, the
measure is based on quarterly averages in one of three categories: overall job approval,
foreign policy approval and terror policy approval. These figures are based on the same
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data as the opinion figures from Chapter Five. This data was drawn using Gallup and
CBS news public opinion polls from January 2001 through December 2004. The polling
question asked was “Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is
handling his job as President?” or “Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W.
Bush is handling his [foreign policy or U.S. military action abroad to fight terrorism]?”
The quarterly approval rating is matched with the quarter in which the roll-call vote took
place.
The first model includes the foreign policy indicator and general job approval
ratings to test the impact they have on presidential victories. The results shown in Table
6.4 indicate that policy type, job approval and chamber all affect the chance of a
presidential victory for both chambers combined. From here, predicted probabilities
were based on the results from the logistical regression. With all other variables held
constant at their mean, the probability of victory in domestic or economic policy was .83
compared to .69 for foreign policy. In the House, the probability for victory was .85
compared to .72 to the Senate. This supports the idea that the President was more
successful in the House than in the Senate. Of the two chamber models, none of the
indicators were significant for the Senate and only foreign policy was significant for the
House. Much like the overall regression, in the House regression the president was more
likely to have a victory in economic or domestic policy compared to foreign policy.
Overall job approval was only significant (and at the lowest level) in the model including
both chambers. This result fits with the findings from the previous chapters that even
when approval is significant its impact is only marginal. That being said, when all other
variables are held at the mean, when President Bush had a job approval rating of 82.9
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percent he had a .93 probability of a victory. Combine this probability with how often his
approval rating was at or above 82 percent and one can begin to see the impact that his
high approval rating had on his success rate.
Table 6.4: Model 1- Logit Predicting Presidential Victory
Overall House Senate
Foreign Policy -0.739* -1.264** 0.097
(0.352) (0.462) (0.592)
Job Approval 0.060* 0.061 0.053
(0.026) (0.044) (0.033)
2004 0.047 0.345 -0.330
(0.510) (0.752) (0.723)
2003 0.543 0.700 0.310
(0.407) (0.613) (0.547)




Constant -2.795+ -2.056 -2.379
(1.667) (2.717) (2.096)
Observations 289 172 117
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The reported results are from a two-tailed test.
Model Two substitutes the average overall job approval variable with foreign
policy approval. This is also a quarterly measure and while the two approval variables
are correlated (r=.94), the use of the foreign policy variable does produce somewhat
different results, as shown in Table 6.5. As with Model One, the measure of policy type is
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again significant for the overall Congress and in the House. Again, domestic and
economic policies were more likely to mean a presidential victory than foreign policy.
The vote taking place in the House was also significant. Holding all other factors at their
mean, the House has a .84 probability of a presidential victory. What makes Model Two
interesting is that not only is foreign policy approval significant for the entire Congress
but it is also significant for the Senate. In the Senate, the higher the president’s foreign
policy approval rating is the greater the probability of a presidential victory in all policy
areas (holding all other variables to their means). Like the foreign policy models in
Chapter Four which found a relationship between foreign policy approval and overall
legislative success, here there is a positive relationship between foreign policy approval
and all of the roll-call votes from 2001-2004. This relationship could again be showing
the positive relationship between foreign policy approval and domestic policy, since the
measure of victory here includes both foreign and domestic policy. Additionally, this
relationship may be reflecting the impact of Bush’s high approval rating on his entire
legislative agenda.
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Table 6.5: Model 2- Logit Predicting Presidential Victory
Overall House Senate
Foreign Policy -0.732* -1.346** 0.200
(0.352) (0.459) (0.598)
Foreign Policy Approval 0.042+ 0.020 0.058+
(0.023) (0.034) (0.032)
2004 -0.151 -0.153 -0.183
(0.501) (0.707) (0.739)
2003 0.507 0.574 0.411
(0.406) (0.606) (0.555)




Constant -1.534 0.603 -2.589
(1.404) (2.052) (1.956)
Observations 289 172 117
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The reported results are from a two-tailed test.
Finally, Model Three looks at the how successful the president was on terror
policies. From what we saw earlier in this chapter, the president was more successful in
terror-related policies compared to non-terror policies. This dichotomy between terror
and non-terror policies created for President Bush a new type of two presidencies – one
for terrorism and one for other issues. In this model job approval is measured by the
average quarterly approval rating of the president on the War on Terror and terrorism.
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Since this polling question was not asked before 9/11 (nor were there any terror votes)
the sample size does decrease to 255 votes overall, 156 in the House and 99 in the Senate.
Table 6.6: Model 3- Logit Predicting Presidential Victory
Overall House Senate
Terror Policy 1.583** 1.596+ 1.610+
(0.585) (0.826) (0.822)
Terror Approval 0.090* 0.116* 0.064
(0.037) (0.053) (0.052)
2004 1.979 3.195+ 0.687
(1.274) (1.868) (1.805)
2003 1.969* 2.871* 1.130
(0.921) (1.399) (1.253)




Constant -7.216* -9.054+ -4.688
(3.346) (4.869) (4.732)
Observations 255 156 99
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The reported results are from a two-tailed test.
In Model Three we see the terror policy measure is significant in all three
regressions. These policies had a .94 probability of a victory for the entire Congress, .95
for the House and .92 in the Senate – holding all other variables to their means. Again,
approval matters in this model for the entire Congress and in the House. Figure 6.1
shows how when all other factors are held to their means, in both the House and
Congress as the President’s approval increases so does the probability of a victory.
Unlike the previous models, here we see two of the year variables, 2003 and 2004,
significant in the House. Holding all other variables at their means, the probability of a
victory in the House in 2004 was .98 followed by .97 in 2003. These findings show how
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much support President Bush had from the House – though not entirely surprising given
the size of the Republican majority in the House those two years.9
























In and Out of Party Support for the President
To gain a more complete understanding of the determinants of legislative success
for the president, congressional support and public approval were incorporated into a
regression model. This analysis will allow for a more complete understanding of how
approval and policy type impacted President Bush’s first term and the general notion of
presidential success as well as the specific role of bipartisan congressional support.
These models will also test to see if our understanding of foreign policy and terror policy
is right and that the president receives support beyond party, perhaps due to deference to
9 The probabilities were calculated using the prtab command in Stata after running a logistical regression.
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the institution. The dependent variable is the overall in- and out-of-party support. The
support scores were calculated by either the percentage of Democrats supporting the
president’s position on the vote for out-of-party support, or the percentage of Republicans
supporting the president’s position on the vote for in-party support. Independent
variables include dummy variables for three of the four years and an indicator if the roll-
call vote dealt with any form of foreign policy. Included in this broad foreign policy
category are those terror votes that have a foreign policy focus as well as more traditional
foreign policy votes. Job approval is also included in the models. This helps to link the
regressions in this chapter to those in chapters three and four where public opinion was
the key variable of interest. Here I use just average quarterly job approval ratings rather
than policy specific ratings. The expected result is that approval will have a positive
relationship with both Republican and Democratic support.
Tables 6.7 and 6.8 examine Democratic and Republican support of the president.
The most interesting finding of these two regressions is the difference between the
Republican and Democratic results. For Democrats, the only factor that influenced
support was a positive relationship between roll-calls which dealt with foreign policy and
overall congressional support. Republicans (Table 6.8) seemed to be influenced by the
type of policy, with the foreign policy indicator being statistically significant. Foreign
policy votes were less likely to have high Republican support, compared to domestic or
economic policy votes, and the predicted support score for Republicans would be 7 points
lower overall and 11 points lower in the House for votes on foreign policy issues. These
results are also interesting in the context of the two presidencies, where Republican
presidents received greater support from Democrats on foreign policy compared to
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domestic policy. Here we do not see Democrats significantly supporting President Bush
on foreign policy, but we do see the president receiving greater support from Republicans
on non foreign policy issues.
Table 6.7: Regression Analysis of Democratic Support Scores
Overall Support House Senate
Job Approval 0.414 0.461 0.322
(0.301) (0.410) (0.461)
2004 3.166 5.447 0.699
(7.665) (9.734) (12.833)
2003 -8.648 -6.673 -11.884
(5.481) (7.073) (8.919)
2002 -4.325 -1.528 -7.362
(6.447) (8.177) (11.078)
Foreign Policy 9.113+ 6.836 13.360
(5.239) (6.468) (9.393)
Constant 9.249 4.174 17.771
(20.138) (27.286) (30.978)
Observations 289 172 117
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.04
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The reported results are from a two-tailed test.
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Table 6.8: Regression Analysis of Republican Support Scores
Overall Support House Senate
Job Approval -0.142 0.029 -0.370
(0.175) (0.232) (0.271)
2004 -4.481 1.684 -13.872+
(4.464) (5.509) (7.539)
2003 5.486+ 7.950* 1.366
(3.192) (4.003) (5.240)
2002 2.192 1.824 3.793
(3.754) (4.628) (6.508)
Foreign Policy -7.999** -11.954** -0.506
(3.051) (3.660) (5.518)
Constant 95.115** 84.297** 109.573**
(11.728) (15.442) (18.198)
Observations 289 172 117
R-squared 0.05 0.09 0.05
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The reported results are from a two-tailed test.
These results support the idea that Republicans were more unified on “traditional”
Republican issues in the domestic policy arena. One interesting point is that the foreign
policy variable in the Democratic model was not significant, which is somewhat
unexpected. Despite the interesting results from these models, they are fairly weak given
that r-squared figure is low. Given the support figures discussed earlier in this chapter,
one would have expected there to be a positive relationship between policy type and
Democratic support – especially in the House. When a similar regression is run, which
substitutes the foreign policy variable for the terror policy variable, we see somewhat
different results. Terror policy is any vote linked to either terrorism or the war in Iraq. In
these polices, there is a shift in Democratic support from foreign policy to terror policy;
while the foreign policy variable was not significant in the previous model, in the terror
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policy model it is significant. Policies dealing with terrorism had a 19.68 percent higher
support score in the House than non-terror policies and a 27.6 percent higher score in the
Senate. As with the last model, what is significant for Democrats is not so for
Republicans – in this case it is the terror policy variable. Foreign policy has a significant
negative relationship for Republican support, while terror policy is not significant.
Additionally, the year 2004 has a negative relationship with Republican support showing
a significant decline in overall support that year compared to the other three. Republican
support in the Senate was 14 points lower in 2004 compared to the other three years. In
the House, Republican support in 2003 was significantly larger compared to the other
years.
Table 6.9: Regression Analysis of Democratic Support Scores in Terror Policy
Overall Support House Senate
Job Approval 0.238 0.233 0.245
(0.294) (0.400) (0.446)
2004 2.565 4.423 0.125
(7.476) (9.556) (12.415)
2003 -6.111 -4.173 -9.010
(5.313) (6.960) (8.440)
2002 -3.700 -0.583 -7.559
(6.207) (7.788) (10.717)
Terror Policy 23.282** 19.865** 27.665**
(5.513) (7.222) (8.851)
Constant 17.395 15.967 19.132
(19.517) (26.355) (29.965)
Observations 289 172 117
R-squared 0.08 0.06 0.10
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The reported results are from a two-tailed test.
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Table 6.10: Regression Analysis of Republican Support Scores in Terror Policy
Overall Support House Senate
Job Approval -0.110 0.169 -0.392
(0.177) (0.238) (0.269)
2004 -4.702 1.987 -14.141+
(4.514) (5.685) (7.483)
2003 4.585 6.951+ 1.325
(3.208) (4.141) (5.087)
2002 0.446 -1.861 3.694
(3.748) (4.633) (6.459)
Terror Policy 2.460 -0.721 6.943
(3.329) (4.296) (5.334)
Constant 91.855** 74.230** 109.733**
(11.786) (15.680) (18.060)
Observations 289 172 117
R-squared 0.02 0.03 0.06
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The reported results are from a two-tailed test.
This decline in Republican support in 2004 would seemingly be linked to the
president’s declining approval ratings that year. This link does not hold up statistically.
In fact, the public approval data is not significant in any of these models. This is an
unexpected finding considering the high approval ratings the president received after
9/11. Again, these results are not altogether unusual, as much of the public approval
research has shown that it is often not significant, and when it is the impact is minimal.
In this case, the policy topic and other party support seem to be the main contributing
factors in determining either party’s support of the president.
This chapter has helped to highlight several key observations about President
Bush’s first term. First is the idea that he had two presidencies and is the first (though
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possibly not the last) to fit this new concept of the two presidencies. Much like
Wildavsky’s original view where we had one president for foreign policy and one for
domestic, we now see one president for terror policy and one for all other policies.
Whether or not this will hold throughout his second term is yet to be seen, but at least for
his first term, terrorism policy certainly had an impact. This impact is echoed in not only




“I must study politics and war that my sons may have liberty to study mathematics and
philosophy” – John Adams
This dissertation has argued that presidents can use public approval as a tool to
help get their way with Congress. The relationship between public approval and
legislative success is seen best when examining domestic policy. Presidents have and
continue to court the public’s assistance to help persuade Congress (Cohen 2004;
Edwards 2002; Kernell 1997). Although other factors such as unified government and
tenure in office are important in determining how successful a president is with Congress,
this research has found that public approval does, in some instances, play a role.
Empirically, the effect of public approval on presidential success has been difficult to
prove, and this study contributes additional empirical evidence to help show the
relationship between approval and success. Though approval is not a factor in
determining presidential success in foreign policy, it does play a role in domestic policy
success with Congress.
I have also argued that the type of policy also matters when examining
presidential success. Where they once were seen as being the sole policy makers, in the
post-Cold War era presidents now face a changing relationship with Congress in foreign
policy matters. Even with the changes in presidential-congressional relations, we still see
that different factors influence this relationship in domestic policy compared to foreign
policy (Ponder and Moon 2005; Prins and Marshall 2001). Additionally, we see in the
first four years of President George W. Bush’s term a new type of policy arise: terror
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policy. These policies, in a post-9/11 climate, met with greater legislative success
compared to other policies on more traditional domestic and foreign policy issues.
Quantitative Analysis
In chapters three and four, I used statistical analyses to examine the impact of
congressional and presidential factors on presidential success from 1974-2004. This
quantitative analysis indicated that public approval is significant in domestic policy
success with Congress but has no relationship to foreign policy success. In fact, both
domestic policy approval and foreign policy approval had a positive relationship with
domestic policy success as well as overall legislative success. I attribute this relationship
between domestic policy success and public approval to the fact that the president must
work more directly with Congress on domestic policy than foreign policy. Members of
Congress and their constituents tend to be more aware of domestic policy matters. This,
then, forces the president to use all available tools to gain leverage when dealing with
Congress on domestic policy. The results also reveal that while some of these same
factors and tools, like unified government, may have some influence over foreign policy,
approval does not.
Case Studies
Chapters three and four provided a comparison of all the presidents since 1971
and how several variables, especially public approval, were related to presidential success
in both domestic and foreign policy. This initial analysis did not provide a detailed look
at the different types of legislation a president takes a position on throughout an
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administration or how a president’s approval changes within any one year. Also missing
was an in-depth look at what factors influenced the likelihood of a presidential victory on
different types of legislation. Consequently, chapters five and six included a more
detailed analysis of the first four years of President George W. Bush. These chapters
illustrate the changes that occur in public approval within an administration but they also
help to show the variety of the types of legislation on which presidents take positions.
Here we also see the difference in congressional support on roll-calls dealing with
terrorism compared to other types of legislation – both domestic and foreign. The case
study method also allows for a quantitative look at not only what factors influenced the
likelihood of a victory for the president but also what influenced both in- and out-of-party
support on each vote. In both models the results find that the type of policy makes a
difference. Also, there is a difference between the two chambers, with the House more
supportive of President Bush. This may reflect the partisan differences between the
House and Senate and the size of the majority in each. In the models examining the
likelihood of a presidential victory, we also see the approval variables matter, indicating
that there was a positive relationship between the President Bush’s quarterly approval
rating and the likelihood of a victory.
Contributions and Implications
This dissertation contributes to our understanding of the linkage between
domestic and foreign policy success and job approval by looking at the impact of policy-
specific approval ratings on legislative success. To that end, I made two key
contributions in the first portion of this dissertation. First, I used policy-specific approval
ratings in the analysis, which had not been done previously. To accomplish this I created
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a data set of policy-specific approval ratings going back to 1971 (which was as far back
as possible given the nature of polling questions used prior to that date). Though the
findings from the policy specific approval data were not substantively different from
previous research using Gallup polling data, the analysis showing the support from
foreign policy approval to domestic policy success in enlightening. Potentially, we are
seeing the cross-over effect for a president who is judged as doing well in foreign policy
to have some additional political capital in the domestic policy arena. As if the American
public is saying, you have done this well in foreign policy so we will give you some
leeway in domestic policy.
Secondly, I examined presidential success in domestic policy separately from
foreign policy. While this separation had been done previously, it has not been done in a
side-by-side manner to see how the variables behave differently in each of the models.
Other prominent studies have looked overall policy success and the role approval plays
(Ponder and Moon 2005; Cohen et al 2000). Only Prins and Marshall (2001) really
looked at the different policy issues in a side-by-side manner, and here they focused
mostly on the impact of the end of the Cold War on congressional support. This analysis
is different because, not only does it examine both foreign and domestic policy, but it
also utilizes policy-specific approval data in addition to general approval data. This
policy-specific data is a new addition in the study of presidential legislative success.
What we see from the first portion of this dissertation is support for the previous
view that public approval matters only in certain instances and, when it does matter it
does so only at the margins (Edwards 1989, 2002; Bond and Fleisher 1990). But the
ideas presented here speak to the notion that how we examine foreign policy relations
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between the president and Congress should be different from our approach in domestic
policy (Ponder and Moon 2005; Prins and Marshall 2001). Yes, some of the same
institutional factors – like unified government and tenure in office – impact legislative
success in both areas. However, the nature of the substantive differences in these two
policy types does change how the models operate. The domestic policy model discussed
here lends to our understanding of how approval matters. One interesting finding was
that domestic policy approval matters in domestic policy success but foreign policy
approval also affects domestic policy success. When the president has high support from
the American public in foreign policy, he/she can use that to an advantage in getting
congressional support on domestic issues. However, the models used for foreign policy
success tell us very little other than the fact that what matters in domestic policy does not
matter in foreign policy. This lack of quantitative support does highlight is that the two
policy areas operate differently. It also shows that there must be additional factors that
influence foreign policy and that this certainly warrants additional study.
Secondly, this dissertation begins to look at not only the George W. Bush
administration in a quantitative manner. This approach takes the two previously
discussed ideas, policy specific differences on votes and public approval and incorporates
them into an analysis of how both public approval and policy type impacted Bush’s
success in his first term. This was accomplished by creating a new dataset based on the
first four years of the Bush presidency. This dataset includes not only substantive
information on every roll-call President Bush took a position on from 2001-2004 but also
all of the Gallup polling data from those years. The job approval dataset includes
approval ratings in overall job approval, domestic policy, economic policy, foreign
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policy, terrorism, and the war in Iraq. This contributes to the accumulation of knowledge
and allows for the opportunity to expand this data to include additional years in his
administration. This data set also provides the materials needed for an analysis of Bush’s
first term – this also contributes to the existing literature. The analysis allowed for an
expanded understanding of how President Bush’s approval ratings changed over his first
four years – and how world events impacted his approval ratings in a variety of policy
areas.
The overall finding from the Bush analysis is that Congress was more likely to
support policies that dealt with terrorism in some form compared to any other policy
type. This support for the President Bush in terrorism policy may be a single case
instance. That being said, there is the potential for continuing support for the argument
presidents will continue to have what may be a new form of the two presidencies where
they receive greater support in terrorism policy compared to other policy types. This
idea speaks to the continuing debate over the existence of the two presidencies (Canes-
Wrone et al. 2006; Fleisher et al. 2000). While in the first four years of Bush’s
presidency we do not see a traditional two presidencies we do see something new
developing – a terrorism two presidencies. In this form we see the president being more
successful in terrorism policy than in other policy types. The implications of this are yet
to be seen, but the potential for a new type of two presidencies does exist and this new
idea is a contribution to the body of research on the two presidencies (Wildavsky 1966;
Conley 1997; Fleisher et al 2000; Schraufnagel & Shellman 2001). I find quantitative
support for the concept that terror policy has greater support in Congress compared to
other types of policy. While terror policy is so far unique to the Bush administration,
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analogies can be made to national security and defense policies during the Cold War,
which were framed as protecting the country from potential dangers. The strong support
for terror policy is fleshed out in both the model examining presidential victories and the
model looking at in- and out-of-party support. There is also additional support for the
role that public approval plays in presidential success. In the victory models we see both
foreign policy and terrorism policy approval have a positive relationship with presidential
victory. Though the results from the case study are limited to just the first part of the
Bush administration, they are useful in not only expanding our understanding of how job
approval impacts victory, but also in how the type of policy makes a difference to
success. Here we see the impact of terrorism policy on Bush’s relationship with
Congress. While the lasting implications of this relationship are still being played out,
this first look lends a great deal of information to what is already known.
A wealth of research questions concerning policy differences and public approval
remains to be addressed using a possible expansion of the Bush data set. One interesting
question would be to see the impact of the 2006 congressional election on the models
used in this dissertation. Additionally, as the war in Iraq has continued and President
Bush’s approval ratings have declined there may be greater potential for empirically
testing the relationship between approval and presidential success. Also, there may be
changing support for the president in terrorism policy, since this policy was measured
initially to include legislation dealing with Iraq. Certainly, this research would imply that
in the post-9/11 era, presidents will receive greater support in policy areas which are seen
as protecting the country from terrorism. However, the nature of these policies and the
manner in which they engage U.S. forces may influence the amount of support they
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receive. For post-Bush presidents the issue is whether or not terror policy will continue
to be an area of bipartisan congressional support, or if the war in Iraq and the Bush
administration’s handling of it have made any terrorism-related policy a partisan issue.
Overall, this dissertation offers a view that public approval does at times play a
role in presidential success. More so, it supports the view that in executive-legislative
relations there is still much to be learned about how and why domestic policy is different
from foreign policy. The empirical analysis and case study indicated that when approval
matters, it makes only a small impact. Policy type, be it domestic, foreign or terror, also
influences the president’s relationship with Congress. This research is a starting point for
understanding how these policies will continue to influence the relationship between the
executive and legislative and where future research should continue.
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2001 45 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Act of 200 DOM HR 3
2001 70 Congressional Budget for Fiscal Year 2002 DOM H Con Res 83
2001 75 Marriage Penalty and Family Tax Relief Act DOM HR 6
2001 84 Death Tax Elimination Act of 2001 DOM HR 8
2001 88 Unborn Victims Act DOM HR 503
2001 104 Congressional Budget for Fiscal Year 2002 DOM H Con Res 83
2001 118 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act DOM HR1836
2001 130 No Child Left Behind DOM HR1
2001 135 No Child Left Behind DOM HR1
2001 144 No Child Left Behind DOM HR1
2001 145 No Child Left Behind DOM HR1
2001 149 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act DOM HR1836
2001 176 2001 Supplemental Appropriations Act DOM HR2216
2001 254 The Community Solutions Act DOM HR7
2001 256 2001 Supplemental Appropriations Act DOM HR2217
2001 288 Fiscal 2002 VA DOM HR 2620
2001 302 Human Cloning DOM HR2505
2001 304 Human Cloning DOM HR2506
2001 317 Securing Americas Future Energy Act DOM HR 4
2001 320 Securing Americas Future Energy Act DOM HR 5
2001 329 Bipartisan Patient Protection Act DOM HR 2563
2001 332 Bipartisan Patient Protection Act DOM HR 2564
2001 371 Farm Security Act DOM HR2646
2001 404 To provide tax incentives for economic recovery. DOM HR3090
2001 497 No Child Left Behind Act DOM HR1
2001 30 Bankruptcy DOM S420
2001 43 Campaign Finance DOM S27
2001 69 No child left behind DOM HCONRES83
2001 87 Brownfields Revitalization and Environmental Restoration Act of 2001 DOM S350
2001 98 Fiscal 2002 DOM HCONRES83
2001 103 Education DOM S1
2001 108 Education DOM S1
2001 165 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 DOM HR1836
2001 170 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2002 DOM HR1837
2001 174 Education DOM S1
2001 176 Education DOM S1
2001 179 Education DOM S1
2001 180 Education DOM S1
2001 183 Education DOM S1
2001 184 Education DOM S1
2001 192 Education DOM S1
2001 219 Bipartisan Patient Protection Act DOM S1052
2001 220 Bipartisan Patient Protection Act DOM S1052
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2001 228 Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2001 DOM HR2216
2001 261 Emergency Agricultural Assistance Act of 2001. DOM S1246
2001 336
A joint resolution suspending certain provisions of law pursuant to section 258(a)(2) of the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. DOM S.J. Res. 28;
2001 368 Agriculture, Conservation, and Rural Enhancement Act of 2001 DOM S1731
2001 371 No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 DOM S1
2001 372 No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 DOM S1
2001 374 No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 DOM S1
2001 377 No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 DOM S1
2002 62 Class Action Fairness Act DOM HR2341
2002 79 Congressional Budget Resolution DOM HCONRES353
2002 92 Pension Security Act DOM HR3762
2002 97 Child Custody Protection Act DOM HR476
2002 103 Fairness for Foster Care Families Act DOM HR586
2002 130
Providing for the disposition of the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 84) disapproving the action
taken by the President under section 203 of the Trade Act of 1974 DOM H.RES.414
2002 133 Yucca Mountain Repository Site Approval Act DOM HJRES87
2002 170 Personal Responsibility, Work, and Family Promotion Act DOM HR4737
2002 207 Taxes DOM HR4823
2002 208 Taxes DOM HR4800
2002 217 Permanent Death Tax Repeal Act DOM HR2143
2002 219 Permanent Death Tax Repeal Act DOM HR2143
2002 256 Child Obscenity and Pornography Prevention Act of 2002 DOM HR4623
2002 279 To amend title 31 of the United States Code to increase the public debt limit. DOM S2578
2002 343 Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act DOM HR4965
2002 371 Education Savings and School Excellence Permanence Act of 2002 DOM HR5203
2002 412 Abortion Non-Discrimination Act DOM HR4691
2002 421 Help Efficient, Accessible, Low Cost, Timely Healthcare Act of 2002 DOM HR4600
2002 143
Motion to Table Nickles Amdt. No. 3588; To restore the discretion of the President to agree
with Congressionally-designated emergency spending. DOM HR4775
2002 148 A bill to amend title 31 of the United States Code to increase the public debt limit. DOM S2578
2002 151 To permanently repeal the death tax. DOM HR8
2002 159 Budget DOM S2514
2002 212 To provide emergency disaster assistance to agricultural producers. DOM HR5093
2003 7 Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 2002 DOM S23
2003 30 Personal Responsibility, Work, and Family Promotion Act DOM HR4
2003 37 Human Cloning Prohibition Act DOM HR534
2003 39 Human Cloning Prohibition Act DOM HR534
2003 64 Help Efficient, Accessible, Low Cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act DOM HR5
2003 89 Child Abduction Prevention Act DOM HR1004
2003 92
To provide benefits for certain individuals with injuries resulting from administration of a
smallpox vaccine, and for other purposes DOM HR1463
2003 124 Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act DOM HR1036
2003 127 PROTECT Act DOM S151
2003 135 Energy Conservation, Research, and Development DOM HR6
2003 154 To Reauthorize the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act DOM HR1350
2003 175 Workforce Reinvestment and Adult Education Act DOM HR1261
2003 182 Jobs and Growth Reconciliation Tax Act DOM HR2
2003 189 Pension Security Act DOM HR1000
2003 200 Healthy Forests Restoration Act DOM HR1904
2003 220 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 DOM HR1588
2003 225 Jobs and Growth Reconciliation Tax Act DOM HR2
2003 240 Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act DOM HR760
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2003 241 Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act DOM HR760
2003 242 Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act DOM HR760
2003 272 Class Action Fairness Act DOM HR1115
2003 288 Death Tax Repeal Permanency Act DOM HR8
2003 296 Small Business Health Fairness Act of 2003 DOM HR660
2003 332 Medicare Prescription Drug and Modernization Act DOM HR1
2003 351
Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 2004 DOM HR2660
2003 386
Department of the Interior Appropriations and related agencies for fiscal year ending
September 30, 2004 DOM HR2691
2003 407 Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary Appropriations FY 2004 DOM HR2799
2003 441 School Readiness Act DOM HR2210
2003 442 School Readiness Act DOM HR2210
2003 444 School Readiness Act DOM HR2210
2003 445 Pharmaceutical Market Access Act DOM HR2427
2003 485
Making appropriations for the Departments of Transportation and Treasury, and independent
agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2004, and for other purposes. DOM HR2989
2003 486
Making appropriations for the Departments of Transportation and Treasury, and independent
agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2004, and for other purposes. DOM HR2989
2003 487
Making appropriations for the Departments of Transportation and Treasury, and independent
agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2004, and for other purposes. DOM HR2989
2003 499 Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act DOM HR2622
2003 530 Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act DOM S3
2003 630 Energy Conservation, Research, and Development DOM HR6
2003 656 Healthy Forests Restoration Act DOM HR1904
2003 667 Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act DOM HR2622
2003 669 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act DOM HR1
2003 12
Joint Resolution making consolidated appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30,
2003 DOM HJRES2
2003 16
Joint Resolution making consolidated appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30,
2003 DOM HJRES2
2003 35 PROTECT Act DOM S151
2003 46 Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act DOM S3
2003 49 Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act DOM S3
2003 51 Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act DOM S3
2003 59
To prevent consideration of drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in a fast-track
budget reconciliation bill. DOM SCONRES23
2003 76 Reduce tax cut DOM SCONRES23
2003 132 PROTECT Act DOM S151
2003 171
An original bill to provide for reconciliation pursuant to section 201 of the concurrent
resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2004. DOM S1054
2003 173 Tax Cuts DOM S1054
2003 174 Hope and Lifetime Learning Scholarship Credits DOM S1054
2003 179 Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 DOM HR2
2003 209
To eliminate methyl tertiary butyl ether from the United States fuel supply, to increase
production and use of renewable fuel, and to increase the Nation's energy independence. DOM S14
2003 222
To prohibit the Secretary of Transportation from transferring certain air traffic control
functions to nongovernmental entities. DOM S824
2003 256
To express the sense of the Senate that the Committee on Finance should hold hearing
regarding permitting States to provide health benefits to legal immigrants under Medicaid and
SCHIP as part of the reauthorization of the temporary assistance for needy families program. DOM S1
2003 264 Patients First Act of 2003 DOM S11
2003 309
To amend title 49, United States Code, to improve the system for enhancing automobile fuel
efficiency. DOM S14
2003 334 To protect the rights of employees to receive overtime compensation. DOM HR2660
2003 348
A joint resolution disapproving the rule submitted by the Federal Communications
Commission with respect to broadcast media ownership. DOM SJRES17
2003 361
Making appropriations for the Department of the Interior and related agencies for the fiscal
year ending September 30, 2004 DOM HR2691
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2003 402 Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 DOM S3
2003 408
To prohibit the use of funds for implementing the 2003 revision of Office of Management
and Budget Circular DOM HR2989
2003 420 Greenhouse Gases DOM S139
2003 428 Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003 DOM HR1904
2003 437 As Amended; Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 DOM HR2622
2003 456 Conference Report; Energy Policy Act of 2003 DOM HR6
2003 459 Prescription Drug and Medicare Improvement Act of 2003 DOM HR1
2004 15 Faith Based Initiatives DOM HR3030
2004 17 Faith Based Initiatives DOM HR3030
2004 31 Fetal Protection DOM HR1997
2004 54 Tort Reform DOM HR339
2004 55 Broadcast Indencency DOM HR3717
2004 114 Highway Spending DOM HR3550
2004 138
To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to permanently extend the marriage penalty
relief DOM HR 4181
2004 144 Middle-Class Alternative Minimum Tax Relief Act DOM HR 4227
2004 166 Medical Malpractice DOM HR4280
2004 170
o amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to permanently extend the 10-percent individual
income tax rate bracket DOM HR 4275
2004 197 Abortion DOM HR4200
2004 225 Job Training DOM HR444
2004 254 Environment DOM HR4568
2004 263 Environment DOM HR4568
2004 318 Spending Control Act DOM HR 4663
2004 329 Fiscal 2005 - DOJ DOM HR 4754
2004 339 Fiscal 2005 - Law Enforcement DOM HR 4754
2004 410 Gay Marriage DOM HR 3313
2004 434 Labor DOM HR 5006
2004 457 Federal Employees DOM HR 5025
2004 472 IRS Code DOM HR 1308
2004 484 Gay Marriage Amendment DOM H J Res 106
2004 13 Amendment to Fiscal Highway Funds DOM S1072
2004 14
A bill to authorize funds for Federal-aid highways, highway safety programs, and transit
programs, and for other purposes. DOM S1072
2004 15 Medical Malpractice DOM S2061
2004 61 Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004 DOM S.AMDT.2858
2004 63 Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004 DOM HR 1997
2004 64 Child Care Funding DOM S.AMDT.2937
2004 66 Pregnancy and Trauma Care Access Protection Act of 2004 DOM S2207
2004 79
Harkin Amdt. No. 3107; To amend the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to clarify provisions
relating to overtime pay. DOM S1637
2004 93 Education DOM S1248
2004 154 Class Action suits DOM S062
2004 155 Marriage Protection Act DOM SJRES40
2004 168 Federal Employees DOM HR 4567
2004 188 Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004 DOM HR 1308
2002 229 Marriage Penalty Relief Provisions Made Permanent DOM HR4019
2002 248 Retirement Savings Security Act DOM HR4931
2001 115 Fiscal 2002 State Department FOR HR1646
2001 270 Cuba Embargo FOR HR2590
2001 271 Cuba Embargo FOR HR2590
2001 276
To provide protection to American Servicemen who were used in World War II as slave
labor. FOR HR2500
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2002 145 Department of Defense Authorization Act for FY 2003 FOR HR4546
2002 176 Embassy Employee Compensation Act FOR HR3375
2002 331
Amendment prohibits the use of any funding to administer or enforce part 515 of D807 title
31, Code of Federal Regulations (the Cuban Assets Control regulations) with respect to travel
to Cuba. FOR HR5120
2002 333
Amendment sought to prohibit use of funds in the bill to implement, administer, or enforce
the economic embargo of Cuba. FOR HR5120
2002 463 Department of Defense Authorization Act for FY 2003 FOR HR4546
2003 158 United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act FOR HR1298
2003 216
Amendment sought to transfer Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator program funding of $15
million and advanced concepts initiative activities funding of $6 million to conventional
programs to defeat hardened and deeply buried targets FOR HR1588
2003 334 Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2004 FOR HR2658
2003 362 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005 FOR HR1950
2003 368 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005 FOR HR1950
2003 425 Foreign Operations Appropriations, FY 2004 FOR HR2800
2003 483
Amendment prohibits any funds in the bill from being used to enforce regulations that restrict
United States citizens from traveling to Cuba. FOR HR2989
2003 484
Amendment prohibits any funds in the bill from being used to enforce restrictions on
remittances made to Cuban nationals or Cuban households. FOR HR2989
2003 43 US-SOVIET TREATY FOR
Treaty Doc.
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To provide alternate terms for the United States participation in the Global Fund to Fight
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. FOR HR1298
2003 186
To strike the repeal of the prohibition on research and development of low-yield nuclear
weapons. FOR S1050
2003 189 To prohibit the use of funds for a nuclear earth penetration weapon. FOR S1050
2003 192
To restore a previous policy regarding restrictions on use of Department of Defense medical
facilities. FOR S1050
2003 205 To repeal the authorities and requirements for a base closure round in 2005. FOR HR1588
2003 267
Department of State and international broadcasting activities for fiscal year 2004 and for the
Peace Corps for fiscal years 2004 through 2007, and for other purposes. FOR S925
2003 405 To prohibit the enforcement of the ban on travel to Cuba. FOR HR2989
2004 200 Fiscal 2005 - DOD: Base Closures FOR HR4200
2004 461 Cuba Embargo FOR HR 5025
2004 98 Base Closures FOR S2400
2001 181
An amendment to prevent use of funds to execute a final lease agreement for oil or gas
development in the area of the Gulf of Mexico INT HR2217
2001 193 Mexican Trucks Amendment INT HR2299
2001 216
Amendment sought to prohibit the FDA from enforcing laws that ban the re-importation of
drugs originally manufactured in the United States by anyone other than the manufacturer. INT HR2330
2001 217
Amendment allows individuals to import a prescription drug that appears to be FDA
approved and manufactured pursuant to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and does
not appear to be a narcotic. INT HR2330
2001 255 Disapproving Normal Trade Relations for China INT H J RES 50
2001 275
Disapproving the Extension of the Waiver Authority Contained in Section 402(c) of the
Trade Act of 1974 with Respect to Vietnam INT HJRes 55
2001 481 Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act INT HR3005
2001 291
A joint resolution approving the extension of nondiscriminatory treatment with respect to the
products of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. INT HJRES51
2002 329
Disapproving the Extension of the Waiver Authority Contained in Section 402(c) of the
Trade Act of 1974 with Respect to Vietnam INT HJRES101
2002 336
Amendment prohibits the use of any funding to implement sanctions imposed by the United
States on private commercial sales of agricultural commodities, medicine, or medical supplies
to Cuba. INT HR5120
2002 370 Andean Trade Preference Act INT HR3009
2002 110 Andean Trade Preference Act INT S.AMDT.3408
2002 112 Andean Trade Preference Act INT S.AMDT.3419
2002 113 Andean Trade Preference Act INT S.AMDT.3422
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2002 115 Andean Trade Preference Act INT S.AMDT.3428
2002 121
Motion to Table Kerry Amdt. No. 3430; To ensure that any artificial trade distorting barrier
relating to foreign investment is eliminated in any trade agreement entered into under the
Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002. INT S.AMDT.3430
2002 123
Motion to Table Nelson (FL) Amdt. No. 3454; To limit tariff reduction authority on certain
products. INT S.AMDT.3454
2002 127
Motion to Table Corzine Amdt. No. 3461; To help ensure that trade agreements protect
national security, social security, and other significant public services. INT S.AMDT.3461
2002 128
Motion to Waive CBA re: Landrieu Amdt. No. 3470; To provide trade adjustment assistance
benefits to certain maritime workers. INT S.AMDT.3470
2002 130 Trade Act of 2002 INT HR3009
2002 207 Trade Act of 2002 INT HR3009
2003 215
Amendment sought to allow military personnel and their dependents overseas to use their
own funds to obtain abortion services in military hospitals INT HR1588
2003 219
Amendment sought to repeal the Million Theoretical Operations Per Second (MTOPS) based
method for controlling computer exports. INT HR1588
2003 432 United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act INT HR2739
2003 436 United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act INT HR2738
2003 318 United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act INT HR2739
2003 319 United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act INT HR2738
2004 375 United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act INT HR 4759
2004 381 US Aid Egypt INT HR 4818
2004 389 US Aid Saudi Arabia INT HR 4818
2004 413 United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act INT HR 4842
2004 460
Amendment prohibits funds in the bill from being used to enforce certain regulations
restricting family travel to Cuba INT HR 5025
2004 462 Amendment on Mexican Trucks INT HR 5025
2004 156 US-Australia Free Trade INT HR 4759
2004 159 US - Morocco Free Trade INT S2672
2001 341
2001 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery from and Response to
Terrorist Attacks on the United States TERRD HR2888
2001 386 To Combat Terrorism TERRD HR2975
2001 398 Deter Terrorism TERRD HR3162
2001 423 Secure Transportation for America Act TERRD HR3150
2001 425 Secure Transportation for America Act TERRD HR3151
2001 501 Terrorist Bombings Convention Implementation Act TERRD HR3275
2001 509 Economic Security and Worker Assistance Act TERRD HR3529
2001 280
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist
Attacks on the United States TERRD S1426
2001 302 USA Act of 2001 TERRD S1510
2001 313 Patriot Act TERRD HR3162
2001 338 To provide tax incentives for economic recovery. TERRD H.R.3090
2002 53 U.S. border security and visa entry reform TERRD HRES365
2002 206
2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery From and Response To
Terrorist Attacks on the United States TERRD hr4775
2002 328
2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery From and Response To
Terrorist Attacks on the United States TERRD HR4775
2002 357
Amendment sought to preserve the union rights of existing employees transferred to the new
Department of Homeland Security who have the same duties. TERRD HR5005
2002 359
Amendment sought to authorize the Secretary of Homeland Security to provide
indemnification to the manufacturers of anti-terrorism products. TERRD HR5005
2002 188
Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery From and Response to Terrorist
Attacks on the United States TERRD HR4775
2002 252 Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 TERRD HR3210
2003 2 To provide additional funds for certain homeland security measures. TERRD HJRES2
2003 3 To provide additional funds for certain homeland security measures. TERRD HJRES2
2004 376 Homeland Security TERRD S15
2004 452 Homeland Security TERRD HR 5025
145
2001 342 USE OF FORCE TERRF HJRES 64
2001 281 Authorization for Use of Military Force TERRF SJRES 23
2001 357
Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery from and
Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act, 2002 TERRF H.R.3338
2002 292 Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act TERRF HR4635
2002 347
Amendment provides for the establishment of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States. TERRF HR4628
2002 365
Amendment sought to transfer the Visa Office of the Bureau of Consular Affairs of the
Department of State to the Department of Homeland Security. TERRF HR5005
2002 367 Homeland Security Act TERRF HR5005
2002 455 To Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq TERRF HJRES114
2002 476 Homeland Security Act TERRF HR5710
2002 477 Homeland Security Act TERRF HR5710
2002 237 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 TERRF HJRES114
2002 249 Homeland Security Act of 2002 TERRF HR5005
2003 546
Making emergency supplemental appropriations for defense and for the reconstruction of Iraq
and Afghanistan for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2004, and for other purposes. TERRF HR3289
2003 561
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and
Afghanistan for FY 2004 TERRF HR3289
2003 601
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and
Afghanistan for FY 2004 TERRF HR3289
2003 196
To require the Department of Defense to fully comply with the Competition in Contracting
Act for any contract awarded for reconstruction activities in Iraq. TERRF S1050
2003 67 To set aside a reserve fund for possible military action and reconstruction in Iraq. TERRF SCONRES23
2003 380 Iraqi oil revenues be used to pay for reconstruction in Iraq. TERRF HR1689
2003 389 To require that funds for reconstruction in Iraq be used for certain purposes. TERRF HR1689
2003 392
To promote the establishment of an Iraq Reconstruction Finance Authority and the use of
Iraqi oil revenues to pay for reconstruction in Iraq. TERRF HR1689
2004 64 Iraq Resolution TERRF H Res 557
2004 544 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act TERRF S2845
2004 99 BioShield TERRF S15
2004 216 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 TERRF S2845
DOM = Domestic Policy, FOR = Foreign Policy, INT = Intermestic Issues, TERRD = Domestic Terror




Presidential Success: The variable is presidential success on the floor of Congress, measured
as the annual percentage of House and Senate roll-call votes from 1971 through 2004 on
which the president’s position won.
Gallup Approval: Gallup approval is based on answers to the Gallup poll question “Do you
approve or disapprove of the way [president’s first and last name] is handing his job as
president?” The Gallup poll asked this question between ten and 30 times in each of the
years of the study, providing nearly monthly indicators of presidential popularity.
Annual figures are calculated based on monthly averages.
Economic Approval: This variable is based on the CBS/New York Times survey which
asked, “Do you approve or disapprove of the way [the President] is handing [economic]
policy?” CBS/ NY Times asked this question between 4 and 10 times in each of the
years of the study, providing for an annual average.
Foreign Policy Approval: In order to obtain additional cases to capture at least one term of
the Nixon presidency, the foreign policy public opinion variable was based on Nixon’s
average scores on approval ratings on foreign policy issue areas including Vietnam,
World Peace and relations with China and Russia. This was done because the standard
public opinion question was not asked during that time period. However, the standard
economic survey question was asked during the Nixon years and that variable is based on
those results.
Terrorism Approval: This variable is based on both Gallup and CBS/ NEW Times polling on
terrorism. This was done in order to have at least one poll per month for 2001-2004. The
average monthly figures were then used to calculate annual and bi-annual approval data. The
Gallup figures are based on the question: “Do you approve or disapprove of the way
George W. Bush is handling...U.S. (United States) military action abroad to fight
terrorism?” The CBS News data is based on the question: “Do you approve or
disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling the campaign against terrorism?”
Unified Government: Unified government is coded as 1 if the government is unified and 0
otherwise.
Party Percent: The percent of House or Senate members in the president’s party.
Tenure in Office: This is measured by a simple year in tenure count ranging from 1-4 for
the first term and 5-8 for the second term.
Foreign Policy: Roll-call votes dealing with defense, treaties, military action, aid and
assistance to foreign nations and NGOs.
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Domestic Policy Roll-call votes dealing with budget issues, social welfare, and economic
issues.
Terror Policy: Roll-call votes which had possible consequences in either foreign or domestic
policy but dealt with the issue of Terrorism or the War in Iraq.
Intermestic policy: Roll-call votes which had possible implications in both domestic and
foreign policy. Examples include foreign trade policy and immigration.
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